

Running Head: POST-APOCALYPTIC AND PREPPING BELIEFS

**On Post-Apocalyptic & Doomsday Prepping Beliefs:**

**A New Measure, its Correlates, and the Motivation to Prep**

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Data and code are available at

([https://osf.io/zudxp/?view\\_only=30a651548d0f4b7fa2e0ee9d52681b59](https://osf.io/zudxp/?view_only=30a651548d0f4b7fa2e0ee9d52681b59)).

### **Abstract**

Post-apocalyptic scenarios provide the basis for popular television shows, video games, and books. These scenarios may be popular because people have their own beliefs and visions about the apocalypse and the need to prepare. The prevalence of such beliefs might also hold societal relevance and serve as a type of projective test of personality. However, there are no quantitative accounts of post-apocalyptic or prepping beliefs. As such, we conducted seven studies ( $N_{\text{total}} = 1,034$ ) to do so. In Studies 1 and 2, we developed a post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs scale, explored its correlates, and confirmed its structure and psychometric properties. In Study 3, we attempted to activate a “prepper” mindset and further explore the correlates of the new scale. In Studies 4 and 5, we investigated covariations in daily feelings, thoughts, and events, and prepping beliefs. In Studies 6a and 6b, compared scores from “real” preppers and to a non-prepping group. Overall, we found that post-apocalyptic concerns and prepping beliefs are predictive of low agreeableness and humility, paranoia, cynicism, conspiracy mentality, conservatism, and social dominance orientation. We also found that increased belief in the need to prep is associated with God-belief, negative daily experiences, and global political events.

**Keywords: Post-Apocalyptic Beliefs; Doomsday Prepping; Cynicism; Conspiracy Mentality; Personality; Individual Differences**

## **On Post-Apocalyptic & Doomsday Prepping Beliefs:**

### **A New Measure, its Correlates, and the Motivation to Prep**

In 2012, the National Geographic Channel began airing a reality television series focused on a subculture called *Doomsday Preppers*. This documentary-style show highlighted different “preppers”, who would explain their reasoning for prepping, how they were prepping, give tours of their prepping operation, and describe their plan of action or “bug out” plan, for a post-apocalyptic world. While some were hoarding supplies and weapons for their own survival and protection, others were training and growing crops so that they could help others and rebuild. In nearly all cases, these “preppers” had specific beliefs about what the post-apocalyptic world would look like.

The beliefs espoused in *Doomsday Preppers* appear, on their surface, to be the mental playground of fringe groups and extremists. However, we suggest that these beliefs are relatively common in everyday society. Of course, these beliefs will range from non-existent (e.g., no thoughts), to moderate (e.g., specific beliefs, but not enough to motivate behavior), to strong (e.g., motivating relevant behaviors). Some of these beliefs will also be more pessimistic than others. We deemed it likely that the relative strength of these beliefs can be leveraged to understand people’s current personality and motivations, and that focusing on these mainstream beliefs is more informative than focusing on fringe ideas. Furthermore, investigating these relative beliefs in “normal” populations may be informative for understanding the personality of “actual” preppers. The current investigation is an exploration these beliefs and their correlates.

### **Beliefs about the Post-Apocalypse**

The popularity of television shows like *Doomsday Preppers* and *The Walking Dead*, video games like *Fallout 4*, and books like *The Road*, suggests that people are fascinated by post-

apocalyptic worlds. Popular culture researchers have suggested that the popularity of the apocalyptic genre is reflective of a society's collective perception of coming chaos (or "anomie") and incipient collapse or, at least, abrupt change (Brummett, 1990). Indeed, it would seem that this genre serves as a way for the consumer to project their current, inarticulable feelings about society (Bendle, 2005; Ruff, 1979). That is, the post-apocalyptic world appears to be an imaginative place for people to project their current belief systems and desires (Wojcik, 1997).

Leveraging the imaginative environment offered by post-apocalyptic scenarios may be of value to personality and social psychology in terms of understanding people's latent beliefs about humanity and society. Measuring hard-to-articulate attitudes, beliefs, and motives has a long history in psychology (e.g., Murray, 1943). For example, implicit cognitive tasks have been developed in personality and social psychology to solve a similar problem: to measure beliefs and attitudes that are not easily articulable (e.g., Implicit Associations Tests: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Measuring people's beliefs about the post-apocalyptic world and prepping, then, may be revealing of somewhat implicit personality and motivations. That is, it might be easier to say "I fear what humans will do in a post-apocalyptic world", than to say "I dislike humans".

The *relative* strength of post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs should also be informative. For example, we might compare two people who do not (behaviorally) prep for the post-apocalypse at all and find that one of them believes in the need to prep more than the other. This difference may be important. Research on prejudice provides as an apt comparison. Even if two people do not act on their prejudiced beliefs about race, the fact that one of them has more racist beliefs than the other may be consequential (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). As such, the current investigation is not necessarily focused on the "real" preppers depicted in *Doomsday Preppers* –

though we are not uninterested in that population – but is geared in particular to uncover and describe the relative differences in the post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs of everyday people, and the correlations of these beliefs. These relative differences may be informative for normative personality and social psychological theory, as well as for understanding the psychology of more extremist beliefs (Doosje et al., 2016).

The primary challenge in understanding post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs, and their everyday personality correlates, is identifying the specific, realistic, and consequential beliefs that should be measured. While some of the aforementioned work has provided critical analysis of post-apocalyptic media, there has been no empirical work identifying specific beliefs. As such, we gathered information by observing relevant media (i.e., *Doomsday Preppers*) and discussion boards, and by discussing these beliefs with acquaintances. We then placed these observations into overarching themes. Three themes stood out: human nature, resource availability, and competitive survival. Another theme was general pessimism about the post-apocalyptic world, which appears to be a combination of the three themes. Our qualitative analysis was anything but rigorous, but media theorists from a variety of fields have identified similar themes (e.g., Wojcik, 1997; Gross & Gilles, 2012; Murphy, 2013).

With these considerations in mind, we set out to create a post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs scale and explore the correlates of relative differences in these themes of beliefs. We consider this a mostly exploratory venture. Even so, the different themes of beliefs naturally reflect existing variables in psychological science. We, briefly, describe these below, by theme.

**A concern about human nature and resources.** In our observations, two common themes were fears about other humans and a concern regarding finite resources. These concerns were often combined (e.g., “you have to have protection against those seeking to steal your

food”), even though we originally conceived of them as separate. This type of belief seems to reflect an underlying distrust of humans. For example, in our observations, people often expressed the idea that without laws humans will regress towards their baser instincts (e.g., selfishness and violence).

A relatively strong concern about resource availability and fears about humans, in a post-apocalyptic scenario, might speak to underlying anxiety. Indeed, a feature of anxiety is negative future-based thinking (Barlow, 2000; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) and pessimistic outlooks (Miranda & Mennin, 2007). Of course, all predictions about a post-apocalyptic world are likely to be negative and about the future. Even so, resource concerns and worries over human nature are about the fundamentals of survival, which may be at the core of negative affectivity (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). As such, we expect that someone with relatively stronger concerns about resources and human nature might also be prone to neuroticism. In addition, the inherent wariness of humans also suggests that those relatively more worried about other humans would be more withdrawn, shy, and reserved. These are common features of introversion (John & Srivastava, 1999) and we expect some relations with this factor.

Cynicism and conspiracy beliefs go hand-in-hand with humanity and resource concerns. Cynicism is associated with a lack of trust in other humans and the belief that humans are motivated in a negative manner, deep down (Cook & Medley, 1954; Graham, 1993; Rosenberg, 1956). Conspiracy theories are attempts to identify the cause of a certain event or observation as a secret plot by a nefarious group of powerful people or organizations (Goertzel, 1994). Distrust of humans and conspiracy beliefs often preclude apocalyptic beliefs (Barkun, 2013). We also note that popular conspiracy-oriented media (e.g., the “Infowars” radio program) actively sell “preparedness” and “protective” products on their websites (e.g., <http://www.infowarsshop.com>)

and advertise such products within their programs. Overall, we expected that there would be some positive association between two factors and concerns about humans and resources.

**Social Darwinism: Beliefs about competition/cooperation and survival.** In our observations, we also noted a consistent theme of competition, dominance, and survival. Much like Social Dominance Orientation, or SDO (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), many post-apocalyptic beliefs surround the idea that humans are competitive, rather than cooperative, and relish the idea of competitive survival: a survival of the fittest mindset. In fact, some people who we observed seemed excited by the idea of post-apocalyptic survival. Renner (2012) even draws a parallel between post-apocalyptic survival and the fetishizing of athletic survivalism (e.g., triathlons, mud runs, and military style obstacle races).

The scarcity of resources in the post-apocalyptic world is a reasonable concern. The competitive mindset might be a direct response to this concern, as scarcity leads to beliefs that certain groups deserve more resources over other groups (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). This is a common feature of SDO (Pratto et al., 1994), which also includes the belief that certain groups are superior (i.e., the fittest) and a steadfast opposition to resource redistribution (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Furthermore, the goal of any competition is to gain a leg up on other people. In order to do so, in a successful competition, one needs to block an opponent from achieving their goal (Deutsch, 1949; Campbell, 1965). In the realm of a doomsday scenario, this would entail taking resources for oneself at the detriment of another or even harming other people. Indeed, competition leads to hostile behavior (Sherif, 1954, 1966). These considerations suggest that someone endorsing the Social Darwinist mindset of post-apocalyptic survival also tend to be high on SDO, competitiveness and selfishness, and low on agreeableness, which is associated with hostility (John & Srivastava, 1999).

In a related manner, those who believe in competitive survival are also likely to believe that others are thinking similarly. This may lead to greater cynicism, conspiracy mentality, but also to paranoid thoughts. One of the hallmarks of paranoid thought is the belief that others are out to get them (Freeman & Garety, 2004). If a person believes that people will be competitive instead of cooperative, they may be particularly paranoid that others are coming to take their supplies and, perhaps, to harm them. In fact, in our discussions with acquaintances, one person responded to the question “what is the *first* thing you would do in a post-apocalyptic scenario?”, with, “I’d get my gun”.

### **The Causes and Consequences of Prepping Beliefs and Actual Prepping Behavior**

So far, we have outlined the potential profiles of people who hold specific beliefs related to a post-apocalyptic world. We were also interested in the correlates of believing in the need to prepare—and current prepping behavior—for the post-apocalypse. This is particularly uncharted territory. However, the general predictors of beliefs in impending apocalyptic scenarios might be informative. Traditionally, apocalyptic beliefs were religious in origin, but more recently world events (e.g., war, nuclear weapons, political strife, economic hardship, and environmental destruction) have come to inspire these beliefs as well (Brummett, 1990; Wojcik, 1997). Even so, religious and supernatural ideologies seem to still be at the top of the heap. In fact, certain fundamentalist religious leaders (e.g., Pat Robertson) make connections between national emergencies (e.g., natural disasters) and God (see also, Routledge, Abeyta, & Roylance, 2016). As such, it may be that those high in God-belief are more prone to prepping beliefs or behavior.

A second factor that likely increases prepping beliefs and behavior are world events, such as major political ones (Brummett, 1990; Wojcik, 1997). These types of events may be sufficient to scare people into believing in the need to prep. In fact, in our observations, political strife and



threat of war were often cited by actual preppers, but were also considered “justifiable” reasons to believe in the need to prep by non-preppers. As such, prepping beliefs and behavior are likely to increase following such events.

In addition, each of the three themes (i.e., resource and humanity-based, and competition-based beliefs) should be predictive of belief in the need to prep and, perhaps, actual prepping behavior. As such, the related constructs we have described previously are likely associated with prepping beliefs and behavior, as well. In some cases, these correlates should logically lead to prepping beliefs and behavior, whereas others should follow from them. We make no assumptions about causal direction.

Finally, there are likely some existential anxieties that play a role in prepping beliefs and behavior. Terror Management Theory (TMT: Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), and other related literatures (e.g., uncertainty management and meaning maintenance), have shown that increases in death thoughts and uncertainty lead to a greater need to control one’s environment (for a review of this threat compensation literature see Jonas et al., 2014). That is, at least according to some of these theoretical perspectives, when one thinks about their own mortality or feels uncertain, they want to feel as if they are in control of their lives (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhanel, 2008; Landau et al., 2004). Prepping, in this case, may lead people to feel in control over a chaotic world (post-apocalyptic or current). As such, death thoughts and uncertainty may be positively associated with prepping beliefs and behavior.

### **Current Studies**

Our goals in the current studies was to A) create a tool which measures beliefs about a post-apocalyptic world and prepping beliefs, B) identify how these beliefs relate to common motives, beliefs, and behavioral tendencies, and C) identify factors and events that relate to

increased prepping beliefs and behavior. Doing so adds construct validity by establishing a nomological network around our post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs scale.

In Studies 1a and 1b, we developed a scale of post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs (Goal A) and began to explore its correlates (Goal B). In Study 2, we confirmed its factor structure. In Study 3, we attempted to prime a “prepper” mindset to investigate the causal consequences of state prepper thoughts (Goal C). We did this in addition to looking at further correlates of post-apocalyptic beliefs (Goal B). In Studies 4 and 5, we investigated the daily correlates of prepping beliefs, as well as the impact of global political events on prepping thoughts (Goal C). In Studies 6a and 6b, we investigated the correlates of post-apocalyptic beliefs, prepping beliefs, and actual prepping behavior, in a group of actual preppers compared to non-preppers (Goals B & C).

This project was often running in tandem with other projects. As such, we do not report all variables collected<sup>1</sup>. Even so, we report all variables that we felt were even remotely relevant. Furthermore, given that a number of our studies used substantially similar correlates, and following suggestions in the editorial process, we report meta-analytic effects when possible using Goh, Hall, and Rosenthal’s (2016) mini meta-analytic strategy. In their introduction of this strategy, Goh et al. provide several advantages for including such analyses. Of most importance, providing these analyses can a) provide evidence for smaller effects that many psychology studies do not have the power to detect in a single study, b) encourage the reporting of instances where a null effect is found, and c) provide a service to validating new scales by “amalgamating” (Goh et al., 2016, pg. 537) several studies using similar measures to provide a single, more interpretable, indicator of consistent relations. The method for calculating the meta-analytic

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<sup>1</sup> We do not report the results from two studies, as the data were not of publishable quality. Neither study withholds any information about post-apocalyptic or prepping beliefs.

effect size, in basic terms (see Goh et al., 2016 for full primer), is to convert the effect size estimates across studies to *r*s or Cohen's *d*s and then calculate a weighted (by *N*) mean effect size across the studies.

None of our hypotheses were preregistered. Data, materials, and analysis scripts are available on the Open Science Framework ([https://osf.io/zudxp/?view\\_only=30a651548d0f4b7fa2e0ee9d52681b59](https://osf.io/zudxp/?view_only=30a651548d0f4b7fa2e0ee9d52681b59)). The materials include all measures collected, even if we did not analyze them. We also indicate, where applicable, if the datasets have been published or submitted elsewhere. Finally, all p-values are corrected for multiple tests. To do so, we used the Holm method (Holm, 1979). P values within a given study were first rank-ordered from smallest (most significant) to largest (least significant). Each p value was then evaluated for significance against an  $\alpha$  calculated via the formula  $.05 / (n - m + 1)$ , where *n* represents the number of tests and *m* represents the rank-ordered position of the current test. Although somewhat more complex than the more standard Bonferroni correction, the Hold method preserves statistical power to a greater degree while still correcting for multiple tests (Holm, 1979). We also adjusted reported confidence intervals, in the same manner, by adjusting the alpha levels in step-wise fashion (see Ludbrook, 2000). As such, reported confidence intervals will vary in size based on the alpha adjustments.

### **Studies 1a & 1b**

We constructed 15 items that reflected the common themes that we had identified in our observations. A large sample of participants responded to these items and we conducted an exploratory factor analysis to identify its factor structure. In general, we predicted that these scores would be around the mid-point and have sufficient variance to be of importance for mainstream psychological science. We then explored correlations between our scale, its factors,

and measures that we reasoned would be associated with the post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs, based on our qualitative observations.

First, we investigated correlations between the Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale (henceforth, “PAPBS”) and HEXACO personality factors (Lee, Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005). We predicted the PAPBS, and its factors, would be associated with lower agreeableness, openness, extraversion, and humility, and higher neuroticism. We did not have specific predictions for conscientiousness.

We also included measures of social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), God-belief (Fetterman, 2016), political conservatism (Knight, 1999; Bonanno & Jost, 2006), and positive and negative affect (Watson, 2000), in both samples. In Study 1a only, we included measures of regulatory focus (Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012), and paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005). We generally predicted that the PAPBS, and its factors, would be associated with higher SDO, political conservatism, God-belief, negative affect, and paranoia; as well as less positive affect. Furthermore, we predicted a positive association between our scale and prevention-focus (avoiding loss) and a negative association with promotion-focus (seeking reward).

Additional measures were included for other projects<sup>2</sup>. We deemed some relevant and others not. We describe the results for the relevant ones and omit the irrelevant ones. While we had some general predictions, this endeavor was mostly exploratory.

Beyond these general predictions, we also predicted that some of these correlations would vary in size for the specific sub-scales of the PAPBS. However, since we did not know exactly how these factors would come out, we did not make specific predictions. Additionally,

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<sup>2</sup> Data from this dataset have been published in Fetterman, Curtis, Carre, & Sassenberg (2019). None of the relations explored here were reported there.

Study 1a and 1b were collected in a German and American sample, respectively. While one might predict that Domsday Prepping is a uniquely “American” phenomenon, there are prepper communities all over the globe. As such, we did not predict differences between the samples regarding the PAPBS and its factors.

## **Method**

**Participants & Procedures.** Study 1a consisted of 130 (80 Female,  $M_{age} = 27.16$ ) participants, in Germany, who completed an online questionnaire in exchange for the chance to win one of ten 50 Euro Amazon gift cards. Study 1b consisted of 103 (53 Female,  $M_{age} = 36.66$ ) American participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk<sup>3</sup>, in exchange for \$1.00. We based our sampling procedures, for both studies, on as many participants we could get and afford. To meet the criteria for sampling adequacy (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), we combined these samples. Each participant, who agreed to participate, clicked a link to an online Qualtrics survey, provided consent, and then completed several personality measures. They then saw a debriefing and thank you screen. For the German sample, we used German versions of the measures, if available, or translated English versions.

**Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale (PAPBS).** The instructions to our measure state that we are interested in “people’s attitudes about what would happen if society were to collapse due to some sort of catastrophe (e.g., financial collapse, war, natural disaster, asteroids, biblical apocalypse, etc.)”. We framed the questionnaire in terms of societal collapse, as this seemed to provide the most leeway in terms of interpretation. Participants indicated their level of agreement (1 = “completely disagree” to 5 = “completely agree”) with 15 items (see

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<sup>3</sup> In all studies utilizing Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we set the requirements such that all participants were within the United States, had completed at least 50 Hits, and received 90% approval rating for those hits. This ensured participant quality and only those participants who did not follow instructions were removed.

Appendix for all items) that reflected beliefs we saw articulated in our observations. We varied the focus of the items to reflect concerns about resources (e.g., “If society were to collapse, resources for survival will be scarce”), concerns about humanity (e.g., “Most people are opportunistic and would likely steal or kill others for supplies if society were to fall.”), competition/survival beliefs (e.g., “If society should fall, it is everyone for him or herself. That is, survival of the fittest”) and general prepping beliefs (e.g., “If society were to collapse, people had better be prepared”). We reverse scored items that were less pessimistic (e.g., “Deep down, we are a cooperative species and would likely work together to rebuild society if it were to collapse”). We created a total score by averaging across items ( $M = 3.02$ ,  $SD = .58$ ), before exploring for subscales. This total score, which we call “Post-Apocalyptic Pessimism (PA-Pessimism)”, was internally reliable ( $\alpha = .77$ ) and reflects an overall pessimistic view of the post-apocalypse.

**Exploring the correlates of Post-Apocalyptic & Prepping beliefs.** There is no prior measure of this construct, so we validated it by comparing it to the constructs discussed in our introduction. We have abbreviated this section due to space concerns (see a full material descriptions and justifications in the Supplementary Material 1 file).

**Big 6 (HEXACO) personality traits.** We used the HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2009) to measure the Big 6 personality traits (Ashton & Lee, 2005). Participants rated their agreement (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”) to 60 statements (10 for each factor). We averaged across items to create openness ( $M = 3.56$ ,  $SD = .68$ ), conscientiousness ( $M = 3.61$ ,  $SD = .59$ ), honesty/humility ( $M = 3.23$ ,  $SD = .67$ ), neuroticism ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = .67$ ), extraversion ( $M = 3.15$ ,  $SD = .75$ ), and agreeableness ( $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = .66$ ) scores for each participant. The measures were internally reliable ( $\alpha$ s were .76, .75, .74, .79, .85, & .78, respectively).

***Social Dominance Orientation.*** We included the 16-item SDO measure (Pratto et al., 1994). Participants indicated how positive (1 = “very negative” to 7 “very positive”) they felt about sixteen statements. We averaged across the items to create an SDO score which was internally reliable ( $M = 2.45$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ,  $\alpha = .95$ ).

***Paranoia (German sample only).*** We included the Conviction of Paranoid Thoughts scale (Freeman et al., 2005). Participants rated how much they believe (1 = “do not believe it” to 5 = “absolutely believe it”) in 17 statements. We averaged across the items, and this score was internally reliable ( $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = .58$ ,  $\alpha = .90$ ).

***Regulatory Focus (German sample only).*** We included the German version of the Regulatory Focus measure (Sassenberg et al., 2012). Participants indicated their perceived accuracy (1 = “completely inaccurate” to 7 = “completely accurate”) of 12 statements measuring promotion focus and 12 statements measuring prevention focus. We averaged the promotion- ( $M = 4.73$ ,  $SD = .77$ ) and prevention-focus ( $M = 5.12$ ,  $SD = .77$ ) items separately. These measures were internally reliable ( $\alpha$ s were .77 & .90, respectively).

***Politics and religion.*** We measured political ideology using one question (Knight, 1999; Bonanno & Jost, 2006): “Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Participants responded on a seven-point scale (1 = “extremely liberal” to 7 = “extremely conservative”;  $M = 3.37$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ). We also measured God-belief with one item used successfully in past studies (e.g., Fetterman, 2016; van Elk, Rutjens, Pligt, & Harreveld, 2016): “To what extent do you believe in a god” (1 = “not at all” to 5 = “fully and completely”;  $M = 2.94$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ).

***Positive/negative affect.*** We measured positive and negative affect using the PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1994). Participants rated how much (1 = “not at all or very little” to 5 = “extremely”) they felt 10 positive affective states and 10 negative affective states. We created a

positive affect score by averaging across positive items ( $M = 3.23$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ;  $\alpha = .86$ ) and negative affect score by averaging across negative items ( $M = 2.08$ ,  $SD = 0.68$ ;  $\alpha = .89$ ).

Additional subscales from the expanded version of this instrument were administered but are not reported here, as they are not of substantive interest.

***Moral dilemmas (US sample only).*** We included five classic moral dilemmas (e.g., the Trolley Dilemma) aimed at measuring deontologist (intuitive) versus consequentialist (rational, greater good) moral decision-making (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene, 2011). We coded deontological responses as “1” and consequentialist responses as “0”, and then averaged across the items ( $M = 0.50$ ,  $SD = .30$ ). This measure showed acceptable internal consistency ( $\alpha = .61$ ).

***Other potentially related constructs.*** We constructed the PAPBS at the same time as several other measures. As such, we include the relevant measures. The Willingness to Admit Wrongness measure (Fetterman, Curtis, Carre, & Sassenberg, 2019) is a seven-item, scenario-based scale measuring the likelihood that the respondent will admit when they are wrong, on a five-point scale (1 = “very unlikely” to 5 = “very likely”). We averaged across the items and found it to be internally reliable ( $M = 3.66$ ,  $SD = .78$ ,  $\alpha = .82$ ). The second related construct was resistance to persuasion (1b only) (Briñol, Rucker, Tormala, & Petty, 2004). Participants responded to 16 items on a five-point scale (1 = “extremely characteristic of you” to 5 = “extremely characteristic of you”). It was internally reliable ( $M = 3.18$ ,  $SD = .63$ ,  $\alpha = .90$ ).

The third related construct was the construal of power as a responsibility (1a only) (Scholl, Sassenberg, Scheepers, Ellemers, & de Wit, 2018). Participants read a scenario in which their friend needs help. They then indicated their level of agreement (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to five statements meant to measure whether they felt the responsibility to



help. We averaged across items and found the measure to be reliable ( $M = 5.13$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ ,  $\alpha = .85$ ).

Finally, we included the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU: MacCann & Roberts, 2008), as we deemed it of potential relevance (1a only). Participants indicated which emotion (e.g., “guilty”, “distressed”, “sad”, “scared”, and “angry”) is most likely present in a set of 42 situational descriptions. We scored correct answers with a “1” and incorrect answers with a “0.” We averaged across the items to get an accuracy score for each participant and found an acceptable level of internal reliability ( $M = 0.62$ ,  $SD = 0.12$ ,  $\alpha = .73$ ).

## **Results**

### **The Structure of the Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale**

The primary goal of Studies 1a and 1b was to develop the PAPBS and identify its sub-factors. To determine the proper number of factors to retain, we first consulted a number of relevant indices (see Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Goldberg & Velicer, 2006). Results of an exploratory PCA yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00 (see Figure 1). Though frequently employed, statistical simulations indicate that Kaiser’s (1960) eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule often overestimates the proper number of factors (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Goldberg & Velicer, 2006). An examination of the scree plot showed a steady tapering off after roughly the fourth or fifth factor (see Figure 1). However, such visual inspections are inherently subjective, somewhat unreliable, and also tend to over-estimate the proper number of factors. A MAP (minimum average partial) analysis (Velicer, 1976) suggested that only two factors should be retained, as the average partial correlation between items after controlling for the extracted factors reached its minimum when two factors were extracted. The parallel analysis (e.g., Horn, 1965) suggested that three factors should be extracted, as three eigenvalues exceeded

those extracted from parallel, randomly-generated datasets (i.e., with 234 participants, 15 variables, and 100 randomly-generated datasets). Statistical simulations indicate that both of these indices are largely accurate, but that the MAP test tends to under-estimate when inaccurate and the parallel analysis tends to over-estimate when inaccurate (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Goldberg & Velicer, 2006). Thus, these indices indicate that 2-3 factors should be retained.

We next inspected the two and three component solutions for conceptual interpretability and statistical viability. A promax rotation was employed, as initial analyses indicated that all factors were positively correlated (Fabrigar et al., 1999). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy suggested that our sampling was adequate, .825 (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977), and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant,  $\chi^2(105) = 1349.69, p < .001$ . Items were considered to load on a factor if their maximum loading was  $\geq |.30|$ , and there were no secondary loadings within  $|.10|$ .

In the two-component solution, general Prepping Beliefs (component 2) were distinguished from all other items (component 1). In the three-component solution, Concerns about Humanity/Resources (component 1) were further distinguished from Social Darwinism (component 2). Prepping Beliefs again appeared (as component 3). Because this provided a useful conceptual distinction and was otherwise statistically viable (see below), we ultimately retained the three-component solution. This solution is displayed in Table 1.

Four items uniquely loaded on both the Concerns about Humanity/Resources factor and the Prepping Beliefs factor; while three items uniquely loaded on the Social Darwinism factor. Four additional items (all describing trust in others) loaded almost equally well on the Concerns about Humanity/Resources and Social Darwinism components, and they were thus discarded from the PAPBS factors. All factors exhibited at least adequate levels of internal consistency

(see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and internal reliability coefficients). Further, most means were in the middle of the response scale indicating that post-apocalyptic and doomsday prepping beliefs are common in the general population and worthy of empirical attention.

### **Exploring the Correlates of the PAPBS and its Factors**

We ran a simple correlation analysis including all variables (see Table 3 for correlations between PAPBS factors and Table 4 for PAPBS-specific results with at least some significant relations with the variables of interest and the Supplementary Materials 2 for a full matrix). As expected, PA-Pessimism and all subscales were significantly inter-correlated, with Prepping Beliefs showing the smallest correlation with all others.

**Big 6 (HEXACO) personality traits.** Both Agreeableness and Honesty/Humility were negatively related to PA-Pessimism and Social Darwinism. Extraversion was negatively correlated with PA-Pessimism and all subscales, except Prepping Beliefs. Neuroticism was significantly positively correlated with Humanity/Resource Concerns. Additionally, openness was significantly negatively correlated with PA-Pessimism and Social Darwinism.

**Social Dominance Orientation.** We predicted that the PAPBS and its factors would be positively associated with SDO. Interestingly, there were only significant relations with PA-Pessimism and one subscale: Social Darwinism.

**Paranoia.** Paranoia was positively related to PA-Pessimism and Social Darwinism.

**Politics and religion.** We predicted and found significant positive correlations between conservatism and PA-Pessimism and all subscales, aside from Social Darwinism. We also predicted significant positive correlations between God-belief and PA-Pessimism and the subscales. Prepping Beliefs were uniquely significantly correlated with greater God-Belief.

**Other potentially related constructs.** There were no significant correlations with the other measured constructs after  $p$ -value adjustments (all  $ps > .101$ ).

**Nationality.** Since the data from these samples were collected in the US and Germany, we could investigate differences between US and a European culture. PA-Pessimism scores were slightly higher in the US ( $M = 3.12, SD = .64$ ) than in Germany ( $M = 2.93, SD = .52$ ),  $F(1,232) = 6.61, p = .033, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .03, 95\% \text{ CI } [.000, .096]$ . Additionally, Prepping Belief scores were much higher in the US ( $M = 3.12, SD = .82$ ) than in Germany ( $M = 2.49, SD = .72$ ),  $F(1,232) = 38.93, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .14, 95\% \text{ CI } [.053, .250]$ . Humanity/Resource Concerns and Social Darwinism scores did not differ by country ( $ps > .05$ ).

## Discussion

We combined Studies 1a and 1b to create a Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale and identify its factors. The PAPBS can be scored in total (PA-Pessimism), but also has three subscales. These subscales deal with the types of concerns people have about a post-apocalyptic world (i.e., about humanity and resources), the belief in competitive social hierarchy (i.e., Social Darwinism), and general beliefs in the need to prepare for a post-apocalyptic world. We save the summary of PAPBS correlates till the General Discussion, but point to the fact that the PAPBS factors scores suggest that these beliefs are not uncommon in the general public and do serve as latent indicators of everyday motives and personality.

## Study 2

Study 2 was designed to confirm the factor structure obtained in Study 1. A separate sample of participants completed the PAPBS, and a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted.

## Method

### Participants and Procedure

A Monte Carlo simulation (with 10,000 replications; see Muthén & Muthén, 2002; cf. Brown, 2015) indicated that 350 participants would provide sufficient power to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis of the factor structure obtained in Study 1 (see Supplemental Material 1 for more information on this simulation and on its usefulness over more traditional ‘rules of thumb’). As such, 350 workers (172 female;  $M$  age = 35.7) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were recruited to participate in this study. After providing informed consent, participants completed the PAPBS (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics), provided demographic information, and were paid upon completion.

### Results

A confirmatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation was conducted with MPlus software (version 7.4). All 11 items retained for the factors were specified to load onto their respective factors. Initial analyses of the Study 1 dataset indicated that two items (i.e., “Enough Resources” & “Scarce Resources”) exhibited correlated error terms. Because these items were clearly more similar in wording and content than other resource-concern items, we allowed their error terms to correlate in this model. All items loaded strongly ( $bs > .57, ps < .001$ ) onto their specified factor, and the latent factors were all correlated with one another. Global model fit was judged to be adequate ( $\chi^2(40) = 126.36, p < .001$ ; RMSEA = .079; CFI = .94; SRMR = .053) according to criteria generally proposed in the literature (e.g., Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011; though see Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004, for an argument against rigid application of these rules). In sum, Study 2 provided additional evidence for the three-factor structure of the PAPBS<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> At the request of a reviewer, we also conducted a multi-group CFA on a larger dataset, which combined the samples from Studies 2-6 (total  $n = 864$ ). When factor loadings were constrained to be equal across samples, model fit was again adequate ( $\chi^2(232) = 457, p < .001$ ; RMSEA = .075; CFI = .93; SRMR = .076). Supplemental Material 1 provides further information on this model and its proper interpretation.

### Study 3

In Study 3, assessed further correlates of the PAPBS. The additional correlates were cooperativeness in a common goods game, cynicism, and conspiracy beliefs. If people are worried about resources, humanity, competition, and believe in the need to prep, they may be more likely to harvest more than their share from, and less likely to contribute to, a common good. We predicted significant negative relations with willingness to contribute, and significant positive relations with the amount harvested from, a common good.

Based on our observations, we investigated and predicted positive relations between PA-Pessimism, the subscales, and cynicism and conspiracy mentality. We picked a cynicism measure that focuses solely on cynicism regarding human nature (Rosenberg, 1956). Our conspiracy mentality measure was that of a general conspiracy ideation (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013).

In addition, we wanted to see whether temporarily increasing prepping thoughts would increase beliefs in line with prepping beliefs. Doing so would show that putting someone in a prepper mindset would also make them “think” more like someone high in prepping beliefs (i.e., showing a causal direction of influence). As such, we created a writing task with two conditions to induce a prepper mindset. In one condition, participants wrote about what they would do to prepare for societal collapse. In the other condition, participants wrote about preparing for a hiking and camping trip. We found that those in the prepping condition scored higher on prepping beliefs than those in the camping condition. This increase in prepping beliefs was related to higher scores on the other outcome measures. Even so, since this indirect model was not part of our initial predictions, we interpret these results with caution and report the full details of the experiment in Supplemental Materials 1 and omit it here.

## Methods

### Participants and Procedure

We based our sample on detecting a medium effect with our manipulation. As such, we recruited 133 (56 Female) participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk. This would have provided sufficient power ( $1-\beta = .80$ ) to detect a medium-sized effect ( $d = .50$ ). Participants earned .75 USD for participation. After accepting the study, participants clicked a link to an online Qualtrics study. Qualtrics randomly assigned the participants to the “Doomsday Prepping” or “Camp/Hike Prepping” writing condition (results reported in Supplemental Materials 1). Participants then completed the battery of questionnaires and provided demographic information. We then provided them with a code to enter into Amazon Mechanical Turk to receive payment.

### Materials

**Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale.** Participants completed the PAPBS, with one difference. We added a question to assess participants’ current amount of prepping. This item is meant to be separate from the PAPBS and to serve as a behavioral measure that may provide some criterion validity for the scale and allow us to explore the correlates of prepping behavior. The question read, “Are you currently preparing for a doomsday scenario, disaster, or any other societal collapse?”. Participants responded on a 3-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 3 = “Yes, very much”). We called this the “Current Prepping” score. We scored PAPBS based on our three factor solution (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).

**Public goods.** We used classic public goods/tragedy of the commons scenarios (Brewer & Kramer, 1986) to measure selfishness/cooperativeness. The first scenario was about the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). Participants read about how PBS is a public good, but that it can only stay viable if people donate. However, they also read that the service is free regardless of

whether they donate or not. Participants indicated how much money they were willing to donate in USD, with zero as an option. We removed one participant's response, which was extreme. Responses to this question served as a "contribution to a public good" score ( $M = 13.15$ ,  $SD = 28.03$ ). In the second scenario, participants read about a single lake that everyone can fish from and that if everyone takes two fish per week, the fish population will replenish itself. They also read that no one would know if they take more than two fish and doing so would ensure that their family has enough food. Participants then indicated how many fish they would harvest. We removed the same participant's response, as it was an extreme outlier. Responses to this question served as a "fish harvesting" score ( $M = 3.28$ ,  $SD = 5.99$ ).

**Human-based cynicism.** We measured human-based cynicism using three items from Rosenberg's (1956) "faith in humans" scale. Participants responded to three items (e.g., "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?") on a 5-point scale (e.g., 1 = "you cannot be too careful" to 5 = "most people can be trusted") ( $M = 3.19$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ,  $\alpha = .90$ ).

**Conspiracy mentality.** To assess general conspiracy beliefs, we utilized the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (Brude et al., 2013). Participants indicated their level of certainty (0% = "certainly not" to 100% = "certain", in 10% increments) for five statements (e.g., "I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed of") ( $M = 7.03$ ,  $SD = 2.13$ ,  $\alpha = .85$ ).

**SDO, God-belief, & conservatism.** We used the same SDO ( $M = 2.22$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ), God-belief ( $M = 2.38$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ), and conservatism ( $M = 3.18$ ,  $SD = 1.81$ ) measures used in Study 1.

## Results



We ran a correlation analysis (see Table 2 for relations between PAPBS factors and Table 3 for relations between the PAPBS and the other measures. See Supplemental Material 2 for a full matrix). All factors of the PAPBS were significantly correlated with each other. Prepping Beliefs predicted Current Prepping to a greater degree than the other factors.

There were no significant correlations between PA-Pessimism or the subscales and the public goods contribution question (PBS). There were, however, small significant positive correlations between PA-Pessimism and Social Darwinism and the amount of fish harvested.

There were strong positive correlations between PA-Pessimism and all subscales and the human-based cynicism measure. Conspiracy mentation scores were also positively and significantly correlated with PA-Pessimism and all subscales. However, it was not significantly correlated with Current Prepping. This begins to suggest that these beliefs systems (conspiracy and cynicism) are precursors to prepping.

As with Study 1, God-belief was positively and significantly correlated with Prepping Beliefs. This was also the case for Current Prepping. Conservatism was also positively and significantly correlated with PA-Pessimism, Prepping-Beliefs, and Current Prepping, but not the other subscales. Finally, SDO was positively and significantly correlated with PA-Pessimism, Current Prepping, and the subscales, except for Humanity/Resource Concerns.

### **Discussion**

Study 3 was able to partially replicate correlations from Study 1. Moreover, we discovered additional correlates for PAPBS and its factors: cooperation, cynicism, and conspiracy beliefs. We added a new item that measured current prepping behavior that was strongly related to prepping beliefs, adding criterion validity for our scale. Furthermore, a writing task meant to temporarily activate a prepping mindset successfully increased prepping beliefs,

which then significantly predicted the other measures. However, the writing task did not directly affect any other scores (see Supplemental Materials 1).

### **Studies 4 & 5**

In Studies 4 & 5, we shifted our focus to Goal C: identifying factors and events that relate to relatively stronger prepping beliefs and behavior. In both studies, we investigated daily correlates of prepping beliefs using a two-week daily survey protocol. We predicted that on days in which people reported more negative events, feelings, and thoughts (e.g., negative emotion, death thoughts, or negative events), they would report more prepping ideation. We also predicted that on days in which people had more prepping ideation, they would be more likely to carry an object that could serve a protective purpose (e.g., ranging from a gun to a pencil to keys).

We also investigated whether important political events, with the potential to lead to unrest (e.g., protests), were associated with relatively higher prepping ideation. As such, we set up our daily sampling protocols – Study 4 occurred in the United Kingdom and Study 5 in the United States – so that the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit) vote (Study 4) and the 2016 United States Presidential election (Study 5) would take place toward the end of our two-week sampling period. Therefore, we were able to look at the change in prepping ideation across these events. We predicted that prepping ideation would be highest following the Brexit vote and US Presidential Election, depending on the outcome and participant's opinion.

### **Method**

#### **Participants and Procedure**

We invited participants in both studies to partake in an initial study, followed by a 14-day daily diary protocol. All participants signed up online via SONA. For completing the initial study, participants in Study 4 earned 6 British Pounds and those in Study 5 earned 1 credit

toward their psychology class. They could then earn 1 British Pound (Study 4) and .5 credit (Study 5) per daily survey completed and there were 14 daily surveys. For both studies, we monitored participation and dropped participants who missed five days: standard procedure in the first author's lab and the intent is to encourage compliance.

In Study 4, 90 participants from the University of Essex completed the initial assessment, while 84 (70 Female,  $M_{age} = 24.12$ ) completed the daily protocol. The study was not restricted to students. Given that the University of Essex has a large international population, over half of the participants (48) were non-native English speakers. In Study 5, 137 participants from the University of Texas at El Paso completed the initial assessment, while 125 (85 Female,  $M_{age} = 20.82$ ) completed the daily protocol. We recruited as many participants as possible for one week, which typically leads to sufficient power for these within subject daily protocols.

For both studies, a number of researchers pooled their resources and contributed tasks to the initial assessment and daily questionnaires, as is typical for these time intensive and expensive protocols (Finkel, Eastwick & Reis, 2015)<sup>5</sup>. As such, most of these questionnaires and tasks were unrelated to the current investigation. For the initial survey, participants came to a lab room (Study 4) or clicked a link to an online Qualtrics survey (Study 5) where they completed a battery of questionnaires, including the PAPBS, and a memory task (Study 4 only). They also provided their email addresses and were given instructions for completing the daily survey and the rules regarding missed surveys. For both studies, the initial portion started on a Monday and ended on a Friday. The following Monday, we sent out the first survey at 5:00 pm and

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<sup>5</sup> Data from this dataset has been submitted for publication at one other journal and additional manuscripts will be submitted. However, no analyses presented here or regarding PAPBS or Daily Prepping Thoughts have been submitted for publication.

participants had until 3:00am to complete it. This happened every evening for 14 consecutive evenings. Participants completed, on average, 11.13 surveys in Study 4 and 9.59 in Study 5.

## Materials

**Initial survey.** Participants completed the PAPBS in the initial survey (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).

**Daily items Study 4.** Participants responded to the daily survey every evening with the past 24 hours in mind. First, with the stem “Today, I felt...”, participants reported how much (1 = “not at all” to 4 = “very much”) negative emotion ( $M = 2.20$ ,  $SD = .62$ ), positive emotion ( $M = 2.78$ ,  $SD = .57$ ), depression ( $M = 1.85$ ,  $SD = .70$ ), and stress ( $M = 2.30$ ,  $SD = .68$ ) they felt. In addition, they reported how true (1 = “not true at all today” to 4 = “very much true today”) the statements “Today, I felt like I couldn’t trust other humans” and “Today, I felt as if I was being monitored for sinister purposes” were for that day. These items were meant to measure daily cynicism ( $M = 1.66$ ,  $SD = .65$ ) and conspiracy mentality ( $M = 1.25$ ,  $SD = .43$ ), respectively. They also reported how true (same scale) the statements “Today, something good happened to me” and “Today, something bad happened to me” were for that day. These items were meant to measure daily positive ( $M = 2.42$ ,  $SD = .58$ ) and negative events ( $M = 1.70$ ,  $SD = .45$ ), respectively. Participants then provided their level of agreement (1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”) to the statements “Today, my personal existence was purposeful and meaningful,” “Today, I spent some time thinking about how my life will someday end,” “Today, I avoided all thoughts of death,” and “Today, I thought about how life is short”. The first item was meant to measure daily meaning in life ( $M = 2.83$ ,  $SD = .51$ ) and the latter three were averaged, with the second item reversed, as a measure of daily death thoughts ( $M = 2.02$ ,  $SD = .67$ ,  $\alpha = .68$ ).

In order to measure daily prepping thoughts, participants indicated how accurate (1 = “very inaccurate” to 5 = “very accurate”) the statement “Today, I thought about being prepared for societal collapse” was for that day ( $M = 1.45$ ,  $SD = .64$ ). Finally, participants indicated how accurate (same scale) the statement “Today, I had an object to defend myself at all times” was for that day as well ( $M = 1.81$ ,  $SD = .77$ ). This question measured the tendency to carry a tool that they felt would help them defend themselves. Virtually anything can fit this category, as long as the participant thinks of the object in protective way. We avoided referring to actual weapons (e.g., guns or knives), as these are less available in the United Kingdom and mentioning them would likely preclude participants from thinking of alternative objects (e.g., a pencil).

**Daily items Study 5.** Participants responded to how they felt emotionally ( $M = 6.34$ ,  $SD = .1.21$ ) and how much arousal ( $M = 4.39$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ) they felt on that day, using the Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994) with a 9-point scale (higher scores = positive valence and more arousal). Then, with the stem “Today, I felt...”, participants reported how accurate (1 = “very inaccurate” to 5 = “very accurate”) statements regarding depression ( $M = 2.34$ ,  $SD = .87$ ), stress ( $M = 3.48$ ,  $SD = .83$ ), meaning ( $M = 3.43$ ,  $SD = .72$ ), anger ( $M = 2.50$ ,  $SD = .71$ ), nervousness about ambiguity ( $M = 2.61$ ,  $SD = .74$ ), and uncertainty ( $M = 2.88$ ,  $SD = .79$ ) were for them that day. They also reported the accuracy of the same statements used in Study 4 regarding cynicism ( $M = 2.38$ ,  $SD = .65$ ) and conspiracy mentality ( $M = 1.65$ ,  $SD = .65$ ). Participants also indicated their level of agreement (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”) to the statements “Today, something bad happened to me” ( $M = 2.20$ ,  $SD = .67$ ) and “Today, something good happened to me” ( $M = 3.51$ ,  $SD = .69$ ). They also indicated how true (1 = “completely false” to 4 = “completely true”) the statement “Today, I carried an object or weapon to defend myself” ( $M = 1.27$ ,  $SD = .55$ ) was for them that day. Again, we kept this item vague.

Finally, participants rated how often (1 = “never” to 4 = “very often”) they thought about how their lives would someday end ( $M = 1.89, SD = .80$ ) and thought about preparing for societal collapse ( $M = 1.47, SD = .55$ ). We changed the response scales so that they were more intuitive.

## Results

### Between-Person Correlations

In order to evince the validity of our daily measure of prepping ideation, we averaged the daily items and analyzed the correlations between these scores and the initial PAPBS scores. However, we emphasize daily covariations for relations between the daily variables using multi-level modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). As such, Table 3 only presents the relations and meta-analytic effects between PA-Pessimism and the subscales with the daily measures that resulted in at least one significant correlation (see Table 2 for relations between the PAPBS factors and Supplemental Material 2 for a full matrix). Looking at the meta-analytic effects, there were significant correlations between the daily prepping ideation item and PA-Pessimism and all subscales. This suggests that this daily item has some validity for measuring daily prepping thoughts. Some other notable findings, looking again at the meta-analytic effects, are the positive relations between Humanity/Resource Concerns, Social Darwinism, and daily stress. Interestingly, Current Prepping was negative associated with stress, speaking, perhaps, to the idea that prepping increases a sense of control. Humanity/Resource Concerns was positively correlated with daily tendencies to carry protective objects. Finally, Prepping Beliefs and Current Prepping were positively associated with daily death thoughts.

### Within-Person Relationships

Our primary analyses used multi-level modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We person-centered all daily variables to use them as level 1 predictors (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).

We also included corresponding random effects for these predictor variables to specify the proper standard errors (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). In order to conduct the analyses, we used SAS PROC MIXED (Singer, 1988). All models included random and autoregressive effects. However, the effects of interest were the fixed effects, so we report them alone.

We hypothesized that, on days in which participants reported high negative feelings, they would also report more daily prepping thoughts. Our results supported this hypothesis. In Study 4, on days in which participants reported more negative emotion, they reported more prepping thoughts,  $b = .11$ ,  $t = 3.53$ ,  $p = .004$ , 99.44% CI [.022,.189]. The effect for positive emotion (Study 4) was significant,  $b = -.08$ ,  $t = -3.78$ ,  $p = .002$ , 99.50% CI [-.147,-.021], but this was not the case for valence (Study 5),  $b = -.05$ ,  $t = -2.62$ ,  $p = .081$ , 99.44% CI [-.110,.003]. In Study 4, on days in which participants reported more stress, they also reported more prepping thoughts,  $b = .10$ ,  $t = 3.81$ ,  $p = .001$ , 99.55% CI [.024,.166]. This was not the case for Study 5 ( $p = .563$ ). There were no associations between daily prepping thoughts and daily meaning in life or depression in either study ( $ps > .072$ ). Finally, in Study 5, on days in which participants reported more anger,  $b = .08$ ,  $t = 3.68$ ,  $p = .003$ , 99.62% CI [.016,.137], and uncertainty,  $b = .06$ ,  $t = 3.08$ ,  $p = .023$ , 99.55% CI [.005,.123], they also reported more prepping thoughts.

In terms of thoughts, we predicted that daily cynical, conspiratorial, and death thoughts would be predictive of daily prepping thoughts. Indeed, on days in which participants reported more cynical thoughts, they reported more prepping thoughts in Study 4,  $b = .11$ ,  $t = 3.25$ ,  $p = .008$ , 99.29% CI [.019,.209], and in Study 5,  $b = .14$ ,  $t = 5.60$ ,  $p = .001$ , 99.64% CI [.067,.212]. However, there was no relation between daily conspiratorial thoughts and prepping thoughts in Studies 4 or 5 ( $ps > .524$ ). Finally, as predicted, on days in which participants reported more

death thoughts, they also reported more prepping thoughts in Study 4,  $b = .14$ ,  $t = 3.16$ ,  $p = .010$ , 99.17% CI [.023,.258], and Study 5,  $b = .08$ ,  $t = 3.19$ ,  $p = .018$ , 99.58% CI [.008,.151].

Finally, we predicted that daily events would be associated with daily prepping thoughts and that daily prepping thoughts might lead to the tendency to carry objects of protection. For the former prediction, on days in which participants reported more negative events they reported more prepping thoughts in both Study 4,  $b = .09$ ,  $t = 2.56$ ,  $p = .053$ , 99% CI [-.001,.151], and Study 5,  $b = .06$ ,  $t = 2.98$ ,  $p = .029$ , 99.50% CI [.003,.115], though the former was marginal after p-value correction. However, there were no relations between daily positive events and prepping thoughts in either study ( $ps > .165$ ). For the latter prediction, we used person-centered daily prepping thoughts as the predictor, as we found this to be a more intuitive direction of interpretation. We found that on days in which participants reported more prepping thoughts, they were more likely to carry objects they deemed as protective in Study 4,  $b = .20$ ,  $t = 3.56$ ,  $p = .004$ , 99.38% CI [.045,.349], but not Study 5 ( $p = .631$ ).

### **The Impact of Political Events on Prepping Thoughts.**

In Figure 2, we have plotted average prepping thoughts by day for Study 4. There was a peak on day 12, which was the day following the Brexit vote. We attempted to establish that this was a significant peak in two ways. First, we ran an analysis of variance with day as the predictor and prepping thoughts as the dependent variable. The effect was significant,  $F(13,921) = 1.94$ ,  $p = .023$ ,  $\eta^2_{\text{part}} = .03$ , 95% CI [.000,.036]. Posthoc analysis, using Tukey's test of multiple comparisons, showed that day 12 significantly differed from days 5 ( $M_{\text{diff}} = .544$ ), 6 ( $M_{\text{diff}} = .653$ ), and 8 ( $M_{\text{diff}} = .578$ ), but not the other days. However, this might not be an optimal assessment of this peak. As such, we created a "pre-Brexit" prepping thoughts score, which was an average across prepping thoughts on days 1-10 (the days before the vote) and a "post-Brexit"



prepping thoughts score, which was an average across daily prepping thoughts on days 11-14 (the day of and days after the vote). We then submitted these scores to a repeated measures analysis of variance. This effect was also significant,  $F(1,71) = 5.52, p = .022, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .07, 95\% \text{ CI } [.001, .205]$ . Pre-Brexit prepping thoughts ( $M = 1.40, SD = .66$ ) were lower than post-Brexit prepping thoughts ( $M = 1.58, SD = .81$ ). We could not compare daily prepping thoughts between Brexit supporters versus detractors, as we only had five participants indicate preference for the United Kingdom leaving the European Union.

In Figure 3, we have plotted average prepping thoughts by day for Study 5. There was a peak on day 10 which was the day following the 2016 US presidential election. We attempted to establish that this was a significant peak, as above. The analysis of variance with day as the predictor and prepping thoughts as the dependent variable was significant,  $F(13,1198) = 5.23, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .05, 95\% \text{ CI } [.023, .071]$ . The posthoc analysis showed that day 10 significantly differed from all days ( $M_{\text{diff}} = .43-.64$ ), except days 5, 9, and 11. We created a “pre-election” prepping thoughts score, which was an average of days 1-8 (the days before the election), and a “post-election” prepping thoughts score, which was an average of days 9-14 (the day of and days after the election). The repeated measures analysis of variance was also significant,  $F(1,106) = 24.56, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .19, 95\% \text{ CI } [.071, .313]$ . Pre-election prepping thoughts ( $M = 1.37, SD = .52$ ) were lower than post-election prepping thoughts ( $M = 1.67, SD = .78$ ). These findings replicate Study 4’s Brexit results. We could not compare daily prepping thoughts between Clinton supporters versus Trump supporters, as we only had 14 participants indicate clear support for Donald Trump in the election (though see the Supplementary Materials 1 file for a descriptive figure split by candidate support).

## Discussion

Studies 4 and 5 provided evidence of more momentary contributors to prepping thoughts. Specifically, daily thoughts of death and cynicism were consistent predictors of daily prepping thoughts in both studies. Daily negative emotions, stress, uncertainty, and negative events were less consistent positive predictors of daily prepping thoughts across studies. Additionally, daily prepping thoughts were also associated with a greater tendency to carry objects of protection in Study 4. These results indicate that when things are not going well, people feel the need to prep, perhaps as a way to gain control over their lives. The peak in daily prepping beliefs on the days following the Brexit vote and the US Presidential Election further supported this conclusion.

These results should be interpreted with caution, however. First, our Study 4 sample consisted heavily of international students who indicated that English was not their first language. This means they may not have understood the context or language within the daily diary or initial session questionnaires. This could explain some of the lack of replication in Study 5. Further, in neither study were we able to test the pattern of prepping thoughts for those who supported Brexit and Donald Trump.

### **Studies 6a & 6b**

The purpose of Study 6a was to investigate the PAPBS, its factors, and correlates, in supposed “real preppers.” This is a “known groups” design and helps to provide construct validity. That is, if we are actually measuring prepping beliefs, these scores should be higher in a group of “known” preppers. However, locating “real preppers” is a difficult task. By their nature, preppers are reclusive and suspicious. Even so, we attempted to locate a prepper group on Reddit.com – a massive social media site where people can sign-up and have discussions on any topic. According to Alexa.com, Reddit is the 8<sup>th</sup> most popular website in the world. It also consists of “subreddits” which are discussion boards that are specific to a topic of interest. As

such, we were able to locate a “preppers” subreddit, which had >53,000 subscribers as of October 2017. We created a survey and posted it to the subreddit. Our prediction was that we would replicate the correlational findings of Study 3 within this sample.

The purpose of Study 6b was to have a comparison group for Study 6a. As such, we went to a different subreddit meant for online surveys. We posted an identical survey to that of Study 6a, to this subreddit. However, the administrators of the group removed our survey numerous times for “violating” the subreddit’s rules. Unfortunately, this took time to figure out and we ended up collecting a comparison group, months after Study 6a, via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Even so, we predicted that the participants from Study 6a would score higher on PA-Pessimism, the subscales, and the relevant variables that we measured.

## **Method**

### **Participants and Procedure**

For Study 6a, we created a post on the identified subreddit. This post provided all the information about the study purpose and contact information for the lead author in order to instill trust in the community. At the end of the post, there was a link to the Qualtrics survey. Of those who clicked the link, 79 (17 female) participants agreed to participate and completed the study. There was a wide range of ages ( $M = 34.07$ ,  $Min = 18$ ,  $Max = 62$ ). In Study 6b, we created 80 hits on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Eighty (41 female,  $M_{age} = 35.45$ ) participants accepted our study and completed our short survey in exchange for .50 USD.

All participants completed a number of personality measures, which included the PAPBS, provided their demographic information and had an opportunity to comment. They could skip any questions they did not feel like answering. Given the difficulty in obtaining

participants in Study 6a, our sampling procedure was to get as many participants as possible and to match that number in Study 6b.

## Materials

**Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale.** Participants completed the PAPBS (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). However, we changed the Current Prepping item slightly to increase the range. The question was “Are you currently doing things to prepare for a doomsday scenario, disaster, or any other societal collapse?” and they responded on a 5-point scale (1 = “No, not at all” to 5 “Yes, a great deal”).

**Correlates.** As with Study 3, we collected responses to the same public goods dilemmas. Participants indicated how much they would donate to PBS ( $M_{6a} = 33.45$ ,  $SD_{6a} = 121.31$ ;  $M_{6b} = 12.15$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 21.64$ ) and how many fish they would harvest per week from the lake ( $M_{6a} = 1.73$ ,  $SD_{6a} = .56$ ;  $M_{6b} = 3.52$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 8.03$ ). They also responded to the same three-item human-based cynicism measure ( $M_{6a} = 3.32$ ,  $SD_{6a} = .93$ ,  $\alpha_{6a} = .76$ ;  $M_{6b} = 3.03$ ,  $SD_{6b} = .90$ ,  $\alpha_{6b} = .80$ ), the conspiracy mentality questionnaire ( $M_{6a} = 7.38$ ,  $SD_{6a} = 1.91$ ,  $\alpha_{6a} = .81$ ;  $M_{6b} = 6.85$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 2.16$ ,  $\alpha_{6b} = .87$ ), the SDO questionnaire ( $M_{6a} = 2.74$ ,  $SD_{6a} = 1.10$ ,  $\alpha_{6a} = .92$ ;  $M_{6b} = 2.25$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 1.28$ ,  $\alpha_{6b} = .96$ ), and conservatism item ( $M_{6a} = 3.69$ ,  $SD_{6a} = 1.41$ ;  $M_{6b} = 3.45$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 1.67$ ). The only measure that differed from Study 3 was the God-belief item. Here, we wanted to give more information to the respondents so that they could more accurately specify their belief level. We used the 7-point theism scale created by Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 2006). For this item, we provided a description for each point of the scale:

- 1 Strong Atheist - I am 100% certain there is no God.
- 2 De-Facto Atheist - I am pretty sure that there is no God.
- 3 Weak Atheist - I am not really sure if there is a God, but I lean towards no.

4 Pure Agnostic - I am not sure either way

5 Weak Theist - I am not really sure if there is a God, but I lean towards yes.

6 De-Facto Theist - I am pretty sure there is a God.

7 Strong Theist - I am 100% certain that there is a God

Participants indicated which description fit them the most ( $M_{6a} = 3.33$ ,  $SD_{6a} = 1.96$ ;  $M_{6b} = 4.29$ ,  $SD_{6b} = 2.11$ ).

### **Results and Discussion**

We ran a correlation analysis on all the self-report measures (see Table 2 displays the correlations between the PAPBS factors, Table 3 displays the correlations between the PAPBS factors and variables of interest. See Supplemental Materials 2 for full matrix). All PAPBS factors were positively and significantly correlated with each other. PA-Pessimism and Prepping Beliefs were the only predictors of Current Prepping behavior.

There were no significant correlations between PA-Pessimism, the subscales, and God-belief or the public goods questions in Study 6a. Contributions to PBS was significantly negatively correlated with PA-Pessimism, Human/Resource Concerns, and Social Darwinism, in Study 6b. There were strong significant correlations between PA-Pessimism, the subscales, and human-based cynicism in both samples. There were also significant correlations between conspiracy mentality and PA-Pessimism, Prepping Beliefs, and Current Prepping (6a only). There were also significant positive correlations between SDO and PAPBS and Social Darwinism. Conservatism was positively and significantly correlated with Prepping Beliefs (6b only). As such, we partially replicated Study 3 in these samples.

#### **“Real Preppers” versus the “Comparison” Group**

Combining the data from Study 6a and 6b, we ran a set of one-way analyses of variance with group (Real vs. Comparison) as the independent variable and the PAPBS, its factors, and the relevant measures as the dependent variables. We predicted that the “real preppers” would score higher on PA-Pessimism and the subscales. Indeed, there was an effect of group on PA-Pessimism scores,  $F(1,158) = 11.47, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .07, 99.50\% \text{ CI } [.002, .197]$ , such that a pessimistic outlook of the post-apocalypse was higher for the preppers ( $M = 3.35, SD = .59$ ) than for the comparison group ( $M = 3.00, SD = .69$ ). Also, as predicted, there was an effect of group on Prepping Beliefs scores,  $F(1,158) < 19.32, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .11, 99.58\% \text{ CI } [.013, .253]$ , such that the belief in the need to prep was higher for the preppers ( $M = 3.60, SD = .76$ ) than for the comparison group ( $M = 3.01, SD = .92$ ). This provides evidence for the validity for our scale. However, it also suggests that we were successful in locating a group that was, at least, more likely to be preppers. This would be even more evident if we found a group effect for the Current Prepping item. This was, in fact, the case,  $F(1,158) = 127.97, p < .001, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .54, 99.55\% \text{ CI } [.284, .575]$ . Reported prepping behavior was higher in the prepper group ( $M = 2.95, SD = .96$ ) than the comparison group ( $M = 1.41, SD = .74$ ). Even so, the mean level of prepping behavior reported by the prepper group is moderate, suggesting that we probably were not reaching many full-on preppers in our sample. Group effects were not significant for the Human/Resources Concern or Social Darwinism scales ( $ps > .079$ ).

We predicted that the prepper group would score higher in each of the other variables, than those in the comparison group. After  $p$ -value correction for multiple tests, all effects were non-significant ( $ps > .079$ ), except for God-belief,  $F(1,158) = 8.69, p = .004, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .05, 99.44\% \text{ CI } [.000, .173]$ . However, contrary to predictions, God-belief was higher for the comparison group ( $M = 4.29, SD = 2.11$ ) than for the preppers ( $M = 3.33, SD = 1.96$ ).

We would like to point out that prior to  $p$ -value and confidence interval correction, there was a medium sized effect of group on Human/Resources Concerns,  $F(1,158) = 6.82, p = .010, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .04, 95\% \text{ CI } [.002, .117]$ , such that concerns about humanity and the availability of resources were higher for the preppers ( $M = 3.72, SD = .75$ ) than for the comparison group ( $M = 3.39, SD = .84$ ). This provides tentative evidence for the role of these concerns in actual prepping.

### **Discussion**

Studies 6a and 6b partially replicated the previous studies in a sample of “real preppers” and a comparison group. Pessimistic post-apocalyptic beliefs, prepping beliefs, and prepping behavior, were higher for the real preppers than the comparison group.

We would also like to highlight some of the comments that the members of the preppers subreddit made in regard to our study. First, a common response was that the SDO measure was offensive. Commenters suggested that, just because they believe certain groups are superior to others, does not mean that they are racist (which was not insinuated). The second most common comment was that we were trying to make “preppers” look ridiculous. This may have changed how they were responding. A third common comment was the insinuation that not all preppers are right-wing “nutjobs.” Indeed, some preppers in our observations appear to be “hippy leftovers” and have more left-leaning concerns about government conspiracies. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, several of the members noted that we would not find “true preppers” on Reddit.com. They suggested that most members of the subreddit are “prepper enthusiasts” and that “true preppers” would a) never be found on social media sites, and b) would never respond to a questionnaire. As such, we interpret these results with due hesitation.

### **General Discussion**

The way a person thinks about future possibilities or fantasizes about different uncertain situations may be indicative of their underlying thoughts, feelings, and behavioral tendencies (Henry, 1956). A common trope in popular media provides such an imaginative environment: post-apocalyptic scenarios. Everyday post-apocalypse and prepping beliefs, in a relative sense, might be informative for personality and social psychologists. The current investigation sought to A) create a tool to measure post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs, B) identify motive, belief, and behavioral tendency correlates of these beliefs, and C) identify factors that relate to increased prepping beliefs, creating a nomological network around our scale. We created the 11-item Post-Apocalyptic and Prepping Beliefs Scale (PAPBS), which can be scored as total post-apocalyptic pessimism and as subscales that measure concerns about resources and humanity, beliefs about competitive survival, and beliefs about the need to prep (Studies 1a and 1b). Later we added a question about prepping behaviors to address criterion validity, among other purposes, that should be considered separate from the main scale. We summarize the findings for each factor, based on meta-analytic effects (Goh et al., 2016), below.

Post-Apocalyptic Pessimism (PA-Pessimism; the total score) was unsurprisingly positively correlated with each of the subscales, but most strongly related to concerns about humans and resource availability. It was only moderately associated with self-reported prepping behaviors. Furthermore, it was most strongly positively related to cynicism, daily prepping thoughts, conspiracy mentality, paranoia, and introversion. Other moderate correlates included lower agreeableness, humility, and openness, and higher SDO, conservatism, and daily death thoughts. Weaker correlates included higher God-belief and tendency to carry protective objects, as well as less willingness to contribute to public goods.



Post-apocalyptic concerns about humanity and resources were strongly positively correlated with Social Darwinism and prepping beliefs, and prepping behaviors to a lesser degree. These concerns were also most strongly correlated with higher cynicism and daily prepping thoughts. Other moderate correlates of these concerns were higher neuroticism, introversion, conspiracy mentality, and the tendency to carry protective objects. Weaker correlates included higher conservatism and daily stress, and lower willingness to contribute to a public good. Moreover, we tentatively conclude that these concerns are primary in contributing to prepping beliefs and behaviors, given the higher scores in a sample of supposed preppers.

A competitive view of survival, which we refer to as Social Darwinism, was the least—though still significantly—predictive of prepping beliefs and behavior. Furthermore, this view was most strongly associated with higher SDO and cynicism, and lower humility, agreeableness, and openness. Moderate correlates of this competitive view were higher paranoia, conspiracy mentality, daily prepping thoughts, and daily anger, and lower extraversion and conscientiousness. Weaker correlates included higher conservatism, harvesting more than their fair share from public resources, and higher daily stress, and lower willingness to contribute to a public good.

Belief in the need to prep was the only consistent predictor of prepping behavior, as would be expected from a theory of planned behavior perspective (Ajzen, 1991). Prepping beliefs were most strongly associated with higher conservatism and conspiracy mentality. Moderate correlates of prepping beliefs were daily prepping thoughts, God-belief, and cynicism. Weaker correlates included higher SDO and daily death thoughts, and lower willingness to contribute to public goods. We further found that daily prepping beliefs were positively associated with daily negative feelings and uncertainty, daily cynical and death thoughts, and

daily negative events. They were also inconsistently associated with the daily tendency to carry protective objects. Finally, prepping thoughts increased after major political events that were deemed negative. Taken a step further, some people saw these events as potentially apocalyptic.

These findings suggest that post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are associated with everyday thoughts, feelings, and behavioral tendencies. Furthermore, they suggest that various events are associated with increases in prepping thoughts and, perhaps, prepping behaviors. Importantly, mean scores on the PAPBS factors suggest that these are not fringe beliefs. As such, it seems that these types of beliefs are important to consider for today's society and not just in the purview of entertainment and fantasy.

### **Implications**

Post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are, in our view, of relevance to normative personality and social psychological outcomes. Indeed, the mean scores on our measure's factors hang roughly around the mid-point and, as such, are not reflective of fringe beliefs. This work could be of interest to numerous literatures (e.g., implicit personality testing, misanthropy, political and religious psychology, conspiracy beliefs, and competition/cooperation), but we point specifically to the area of existential psychology as just one example.

Prepping thoughts appear to be associated with death and uncertainty. Thus, it seems likely that death thoughts and uncertainty lead to increased prepping beliefs. This is a similar defensive response to threat that is found in TMT (Greenberg et al., 1997) and various other threat compensation theories (Jonas et al., 2014). And, much like these literatures, prepping thoughts seem to follow world events that some people find threatening (e.g., Brexit and Trump's Election). However, the fact that people might turn to prepping beliefs in these situations could speak to the function of prepping thoughts or behaviors. It could be that

prepping thoughts and behaviors provide some sense of control over one's uncertain environment. Existential psychologists might look at how prepping thoughts and behavior give the threatened an outlet for their feelings.

**Taken to the extreme.** Our focus on mainstream citizens was by design. Most of the beliefs and behaviors of "actual" preppers have been shown in documentaries and it would not be surprising to learn that preppers have specific thoughts about humanity, resources, competitiveness, and prepping. It is more surprising to learn that these beliefs are common in mainstream society. As such, we focused on what these beliefs mean in terms of personality for average citizens. Even so, our results might provide insights into more extreme beliefs.

While we clearly showed that post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are not the mental playground of extremists, our results might provide hints to how extreme beliefs might come about. Taken too far and the beliefs we measured might have important consequences for how society runs and how people cooperate (Balliet, Tybur, & Van Lange, 2016). Conspiracy theorists and extreme right-wing radio hosts reinforce human and resource fears, competitive survival, and even prepping beliefs. Stoking distrust and existential threat among humans leads to dangerous situations such as intergroup violence (Jonas & Fritzsche, 2013), officer-involved shootings (Sharp & Johnson, 2009), school shootings (Warnick, Johnson, & Rocha, 2010), and the desire to form militias (Carey, Mitchell, & Lowe, 2013; George & Wilcox, 1996). In fact, the correlates we found for any and all of the post-apocalyptic beliefs seem to be a recipe for terroristic behavior (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011) at their extreme. As such, it is prudent for future research to uncover the sources of these beliefs and their tendency to become extreme (e.g., in impressionable minds).

### **Additional Considerations & Future Directions**

Our goal was to investigate the correlates of specific post-apocalyptic and, especially, prepping beliefs. This means that we were primarily focused on the aftermath of a doomsday scenario, apocalypse, or societal collapse. Therefore, we did not investigate visions of the apocalypse (e.g., “I think God will come back and judge us all”). It could be that prepping for the rapture is correlated with different personality factors than prepping for nuclear war. The same could be true of a liberal prepper versus a conservative prepper. Future work should investigate these interesting directions and this could start by looking at interactive patterns (e.g. God-belief by prepping beliefs) in our data. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of the current paper.

In addition, we did not exhaust the list of relevant constructs that could be related to specific post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs. For example, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988) seems a particularly relevant variable. Even so, our unsystematic observations led us to include SDO, given its relation to competitiveness and hierarchy in terms of resources (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sibley et al., 2007). RWA, on the other hand, focuses more on discrimination towards “deviant” groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). In the latter case, we predicted that post-apocalyptic or prepping beliefs would be associated with distrust of humans in general (cynicism) rather than discrimination toward specific outgroups. However, this does offer an interesting avenue for future research. A final point on RWA: we want to emphasize that while post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs were correlated with political ideology, these correlations were small (post-apocalyptic beliefs and prepping behavior) to moderate (prepping beliefs). Further, as our Study 6a participants noted, preppers can range from right-wing conspiracy believers to far-left hippies who distrust the government.

In addition to the aforementioned limits of the current investigation, there are some further avenues for future work. First, the training received in the military is somewhat related to

prepping. Every portion of military training is about surviving harsh and hostile situations and eliminating threats. As such, former and current military personnel may be trained to have specific post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs. Indeed, a number of our observed correlations seem to match pre- and post-military personality profiles (e.g., see Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke, & Trautwein, 2012) and pro-military attitudes and values (Bachman, Sigelman, & Diamond, 1987). It could also be the case that military prepping provides the type of control that prepping provides, but for those who trust rather than distrust the government. As such, it would be interesting to compare post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs in military and non-military samples.

Finally, our investigation elicited mostly negative information about post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs. Specifically, one could argue that it paints those high in these beliefs in a negative light, depending on one's perspective (e.g., a person high in SDO might not see SDO as particularly negative; Rutjens & Brandt, 2018). However, there are three considerations that might paint these beliefs in a positive light.

First, perhaps it is rational to be concerned about human nature and the availability of resources. In fact, this was the most common comment brought up when we discussed these beliefs with acquaintances. It seems reasonable to believe that the current level of resource consumption is not sustainable. Even so, psychological science has provided insights in to how humans might function in doomsday scenarios. For example, a large amount of evidence suggests that humans are an intuitively and inherently *cooperative* species (for meta-analysis, see Rand, 2016), even in times of scarcity (Balliet et al, 2016). This suggests that competitive depictions and intuitions about post-apocalyptic scenarios may be faulty. Nevertheless, there is also evidence to suggest that cooperation would happen more in close groups than in larger

societies (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 2000). This lends credence to the *Walking Dead* style interpretation, where close groups cooperate, but compete against outside groups. Future research might pit these two interpretations against each other in scenario-based, game theory, or virtual paradigms.

Second, it could be that competitive survival beliefs motivate productive behavior. Recall that Renner (2012) draws a connection between post-apocalyptic beliefs and athletic survivalism. It could be that the high Social Darwinism scorers sublimate their competitive drive through healthy challenges and productive outlets. Future work might investigate this connection.

Third, and in a related sublimating sense, the television show *Doomsday Preppers* often depicts preppers as well-informed survivalists, horticulturalists, and conservationists. “Those who think about prepping may be able to provide essential training, resources, and “life-hacks” for real-life survival situations (e.g., getting lost or injured, natural disasters, and camping). Additionally, and relatedly, “preppers,” anecdotally, come up with creative solutions for survival. As such, prepping beliefs and behaviors might be associated with creativity, for example. Future research should therefore also investigate the positive aspects of prepping beliefs and behaviors.

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Figure 1

*Principle Components Factor Analysis Scree Plot, Study 1*

Figure 2

*Average Daily Prepping Thoughts by Day, Study 3*

Figure 3

*Average Daily Prepping Thoughts by Day, Study 4*

## Appendix

### Post-Apocalyptic & Doomsday Prepping Beliefs Scale

This survey measures peoples' attitudes about what would happen if society were to collapse due to some sort of catastrophe (e.g., financial collapse, war, natural disaster, asteroids, biblical apocalypse, etc.). You will see a series of statements that you may agree with or not. Indicate your level of agreement by choosing numbers from the scale provided. Please be honest. Your answers will remain anonymous.

1 = completely disagree; 2 = moderately disagree; 3 = neither disagree or agree; 4 = moderately agree; 5 = completely agree

1. A natural disaster, financial collapse, or some other catastrophe will bring about a fall of society, and likely soon.
2. If society falls in case of some catastrophe, people will most likely go crazy and we will have to fight each other to survive.
3. It is important for people to prepare for the collapse of society by stockpiling food and supplies.
4. It is important for people to prepare for the collapse of society by stockpiling guns and ammunition.
5. Most people are opportunistic and would likely steal or kill others for supplies if society were to fall.
6. In a societal collapse where people are wandering around looking for supplies, it would be a better strategy to shoot first and ask questions second.
7. In a societal collapse, where people are wandering around looking for supplies, I would share supplies and work together.
8. If society should fall, it is everyone for him or herself. That is, survival of the fittest.
9. If society were to collapse, resources for survival will be scarce.
10. If society were to collapse, there will be enough resources for everyone's survival.
11. If society were to collapse, people had better be prepared.
12. Are you currently doing things to prepare for a doomsday scenario, disaster, or any other societal collapse? (1 = "No, not at all" to 5 "Yes, a great deal")

Humanity/Resource Concerns = 2, 5, 9, 10(r)

Social Darwinism = 6, 7(r), 8

Prepper Beliefs (Belief in the need to prep) = 1, 3, 4, 11

Post-Apocalyptic Pessimism = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(r), 8, 9, 10(r), 11

Rejected items:

1. If society falls in case of some catastrophe, people will most likely work together and cooperate.
2. I can trust my fellow humans in case of a societal collapse
3. If society were to collapse, I would not trust most people.
4. Deep down, we are a cooperative species and would likely work together to rebuild society if it were to collapse.

Table 1

*Factor loadings for the PAPBS and sub-factors, with discarded items in italics.*

Item	Factor		
	1 “Humanity/ Resource Concerns”	3 “Social Darwinism”	4 “Prepping Beliefs”
(13) Scarce Resources	.796		
(14) Enough Resources for everyone	-.872		
(07) People will kill for supplies	.750		
(02) People will go crazy and fight	.612		
(10) I would share my supplies		.782	
(09) Shoot first & ask questions second		-.672	
(11) Survival of the fittest		-.694	
(04) Important to stockpile food & supplies			.850
(05) Important to stockpile weapons & ammo			.716
(15) People had better be prepared			.693
(01) Fall of society is coming, likely soon			.523
<i>(03) People will work together</i>	-.427	.465	
<i>(12) We are a cooperative species</i>	-.440	.496	
<i>(06) I can trust my fellow humans</i>	-.471	.444	
<i>(08) I would not trust most people</i>	.488	-.345	

Table 2

*Descriptive Statistics and Internal Reliability Coefficients for the PAPBS and its Factors in All Studies*

	PA-Pessimism (Total Score)	Humanity/Resource Concerns	Social Darwinism	Prepping Beliefs	Current Prepping
<b>STUDY</b>	<i>M(SD), Alpha</i>	<i>M(SD), Alpha</i>	<i>M(SD), Alpha</i>	<i>M(SD), Alpha</i>	<i>M(SD), range (max poss.)</i>
<b>STUDY 1A &amp; 1B</b>	3.02(.60), .77	3.67(.79), .80	2.48(.80), .68	2.77(.83), .69	-
<b>STUDY 2</b>	3.14(.67), .84	3.52(.83), .79	2.66(.87), .73	3.12(.92), .78	1.59(.92), 1-5 (5)
<b>STUDY 3</b>	3.23(.73), .88	3.71(.88), .85	2.72(.94), .76	3.13(.82), .74	1.37(.51), 1-3 (3)
<b>STUDY 4</b>	2.97(.54), .76	3.44(.74), .72	2.32(.72), .72	2.99(.67), .62	1.15(.39), 1-3 (3)
<b>STUDY 5</b>	3.25(.74), .71	3.64(.64), .66	2.58(.76), .73	3.37(.62), .55	1.18(.41), 1-3 (3)
<b>STUDY 6A</b>	3.35(.59), .82	3.72(.75), .72	2.51(.73), .63	3.60(.76), .82	2.95(.96), 1-5 (5)
<b>STUDY 6B</b>	3.00(.69), .83	3.39(.84), .76	2.48(.85), .66	3.01(.92), .79	1.41(.74), 1-4 (5)

Table 3

*Correlations and Meta-analytic Effects Among the PAPBS Factors Across Variables and Studies.*

Variable	Study (N)	PAPBS Factor				
		Human/Resource Concerns	Social Darwinism	Prepping Beliefs	Prepping Behavior	
<b>PA-Pessimism (Total Score)</b>	Study 1 (234)	.76**	.68**	.72**	-	
	Study 3 (133)	.88**	.82**	.81**	.40**	
	Study 4 (90)	.81**	.75**	.67**	.23	
	Study 5 (137)	.78**	.68**	.68**	0.14	
	Study 6a (79)	.83**	.73**	.78**	.37**	
	Study 6b (80)	.80**	.71**	.82**	.35**	
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>		<b>.807**</b>	<b>.726**</b>	<b>.745**</b>	<b>.294**</b>
<b>Human/Resource Concerns</b>	Study 1 (234)	-	.37**	.25**	-	
	Study 3 (133)	-	.64**	.53**	.23	
	Study 4 (90)	-	.50**	.24	0.08	
	Study 5 (137)	-	.37**	.28*	-0.04	
	Study 6a (79)	-	.49**	.42**	0.22	
	Study 6b (80)	-	.40**	.46*	.25	
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>		-	<b>.456**</b>	<b>.352**</b>	<b>.136**</b>
<b>Social Darwinism</b>	Study 1 (208)	-	-	.23**	-	
	Study 3 (133)	-	-	.48**	.20	
	Study 4 (90)	-	-	.25	.13	
	Study 5 (137)	-	-	.15	-.04	
	Study 6a (79)	-	-	.35**	.27	
	Study 6b (80)	-	-	.40**	.17	
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>		-	-	<b>.297**</b>	<b>.130**</b>
<b>Prepping Beliefs</b>	Study 3 (133)	-	-	-	.55**	
	Study 4 (90)	-	-	-	.31*	
	Study 5 (137)	-	-	-	.36**	
	Study 6a (79)	-	-	-	.39**	
	Study 6b (80)	-	-	-	.37**	
	<b>Meta</b>		-	-	-	<b>.413**</b>


Table 4


*Correlations and Meta-Analytic Effects for the PAPBS Factors Across Variables and Studies.*

Variable	Study (N)	PAPBS Factor				
		PA-Pessimism (Total Score)	Human/Resource Concerns	Social Darwinism	Prepping Beliefs	Prepping Behavior
<b>Humility</b>	Study 1 (214)	-.29**	-.19	-.35**	-.12	-
<b>Neuroticism</b>	Study 1 (214)	.18	.24**	.04	.09	-
<b>Extraversion</b>	Study 1 (214)	-.30**	-.22**	-.24**	-.19	-
<b>Agreeableness</b>	Study 1 (214)	-.26**	-.20	-.33**	-.06	-
<b>Conscientiousness</b>	Study 1 (214)	-.13	-.07	-.20*	-.04	-
<b>Openness</b>	Study 1 (214)	-.26**	-.13	-.33**	-.14	-
<b>Paranoid</b>	Study 1 (105)	.32*	.14	.29*	.25	-
<b>Wrongness Admission</b>	Study 1 (234)	-.15	-.14	-.33**	.08	-
<b>Conservatism</b>	Study 1 (209)	.33**	.20**	.18	.32**	-
	Study 3 (133)	.22	.10	.10	.34**	.20
	Study 6a (77)	.18	.04	.14	.24	.00
	Study 6b (80)	.42**	.24	.42**	.35**	.27
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.296**</b>	<b>.157**</b>	<b>.195**</b>	<b>.320**</b>	<b>.172**</b>
<b>God-belief</b>	Study 1 (209)	.14	-.03	-.01	.26**	-
	Study 3 (133)	.12	.08	.01	.23**	.22
	Study 6a (78)	.03	-.04	.01	.11	-.04
	Study 6b (80)	.14	.00	.10	.23	.09
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.119**</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.016</b>	<b>.226**</b>	<b>.117*</b>
<b>Social Dominance Orientation</b>	Study 1 (208)	.25**	.05	.42**	.13	-
	Study 3 (133)	.33**	.16	.37**	.32**	.25**
	Study 6a (78)	.28	.11	.35*	.25	-.01
	Study 6b (80)	.19	.02	.45**	.06	.03
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.269**</b>	<b>.085</b>	<b>.403**</b>	<b>.191**</b>	<b>.125*</b>
<b>Contribute (PBS)</b>	Study 3 (133)	-.12	-.06	-.07	-.16	-.15
	Study 6a (71)	.09	.11	.06	.04	.15
	Study 6b (80)	-.39**	-.35*	-.29*	-.28	-.01
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>-.152*</b>	<b>-.105*</b>	<b>-.104*</b>	<b>-.149*</b>	<b>-.038</b>
<b>Harvest (FISH)</b>	Study 3 (133)	.18	.14	.20	.12	-.01
	Study 6a (72)	-0.16	-.08	-.13	-.17	-.20
	Study 6b (80)	-.02	.08	.22	-.12	-.13
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.052</b>	<b>.070</b>	<b>.127*</b>	<b>-.020</b>	<b>-.094</b>
<b>Cynicism</b>	Study 3 (133)	.52**	.53**	.44**	.32**	.20
	Study 4 (84)	.24	.31	.14	.07	-.04
	Study 5 (125)	.32**	.21	.32**	.15	.08
	Study 6a (79)	.62**	.61**	.49**	.37**	.34*
	Study 6b (80)	.50**	.48**	.51**	.23	.03
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.445**</b>	<b>.428**</b>	<b>.385**</b>	<b>.232**</b>	<b>.127**</b>
<b>Conspiracy Mentality</b>	Study 3 (133)	.46**	.43**	.30**	.42**	.15
	Study 4 (84)	.31*	.25	.26	.19	.09
	Study 5 (125)	.13	-.01	.18	.1	.07
	Study 6a (79)	.41**	.22	.33*	.41**	.36*
	Study 6b (80)	.38**	.18**	.17	.49**	.12
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.337**</b>	<b>.223**</b>	<b>.248**</b>	<b>.318**</b>	<b>.150**</b>
<b>Daily Prepping Thoughts</b>	Study 4 (84)	.46**	.33*	.38**	.32*	.35*
	Study 5 (125)	.37**	.32**	.20	.27*	.28*
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.407**</b>	<b>.324**</b>	<b>.274**</b>	<b>.290**</b>	<b>.308**</b>
<b>Daily Stress</b>	Study 4 (84)	.19	.26	.07	.07	-.17
	Study 5 (125)	.06	.12	.24	-.22	-.14
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.112</b>	<b>.177*</b>	<b>.173*</b>	<b>-.106</b>	<b>-.152*</b>
<b>Daily Death Thoughts</b>	Study 4 (84)	.10	-.08	-.06	.19	.30
	Study 5 (125)	.28*	.25	.16*	.18*	.03
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.210**</b>	<b>.121</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.184**</b>	<b>.141*</b>
<b>Daily Protective object</b>	Study 4 (84)	.27	.25	.14	.21	.19
	Study 5 (125)	.13	.21*	.09	-.03	.18
	<b>Meta-analysis</b>	<b>.187**</b>	<b>.226**</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.067</b>	<b>.184**</b>
<b>Daily Anger</b>	Study 5 (125)	.20	.16	.27*	.00	.03

Note: \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$ . P-values adjusted for multiple tests. Meta-analyses calculated using Goh et al.'s (2016) methods.


### Scree Plot





NOTE: Day 12 was the day after the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom.





NOTE: Day 10 was the day after the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States.

## Studies 1a & 1b: Full Materials Section

**Big 6 (HEXACO) personality traits.** Most personality psychologists generally agree that the Big 5 personality factors (McCrae & Costa, 1999) capture the majority of the variance of individual differences in psychological and behavioral factors (John & Srivastava, 1999). However, there is some disagreement as to a sixth factor, which has been termed “honesty/humility” (Ashton & Lee, 2005). Theorists (Lee et al., 2005) suggest that the traditional five factors do not capture this dimension and that it makes up an important aspect of people’s lives. Its potential to capture deceit and selfishness makes it a potentially important factor for post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs. As such, we used the HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2009). Participants rated their agreement (1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”) to 60 statements. There are 10 statements for each of the six factors: openness (e.g., “I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery”), conscientiousness (e.g., “I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute”), honesty/humility (e.g., “I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed”), neuroticism (e.g., “I sometimes can’t help worrying about little things”), extraversion (e.g., “In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move”), and agreeableness (e.g., “Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do”). We reversed-scored negative items and averaged across items to create openness ( $M = 3.56$ ,  $SD = .68$ ), conscientiousness ( $M = 3.61$ ,  $SD = .59$ ), honesty/humility ( $M = 3.23$ ,  $SD = .67$ ), neuroticism ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = .67$ ), extraversion ( $M = 3.15$ ,  $SD = .75$ ), and agreeableness ( $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = .66$ ) scores for each participant. The factor measures were internally reliable ( $\alpha$ s were .76, .75, .74, .79, .85, & .78 respectively).

**Social Dominance Orientation.** Social dominance orientation (SDO) refers to the level of a person’s belief in the hierarchy and competition amongst of human groups (Pratto et al.,

1994). We included the 16-item SDO measure (Pratto et al., 1994). Participants indicated how positive (1 = “very negative” to 7 = “very positive”) they felt about sixteen statements (e.g., “Some groups are simply inferior to other groups” and “Increased social equality”). The SDO measure is well-validated (Pratto et al., 1994) and predicts many important social outcomes (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004). We reverse scored negative items, then averaged across the items to create an SDO score, which was internally reliable ( $M = 2.45$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ,  $\alpha = .95$ ).

***Paranoia (German sample only).*** One could argue that each of the specific post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs require some features of paranoid personality disorder (Triebwasser, Chemerinski, Roussos, & Siever, 2013). We included the Conviction of Paranoid Thoughts scale (Freeman et al., 2005) to test this idea. Participants rated how much they believe (1 = “do not believe it” to 5 = “absolutely believe it”) a series of 17 statements (e.g., “There is a possible conspiracy against me” & “I need to be on my guard against others”). We averaged across the items and this score was internally reliable ( $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = .58$ ,  $\alpha = .90$ ).

***Regulatory Focus (German sample only).*** We included the German version of the Regulatory Focus measure (Sassenberg et al., 2012) to test whether post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are associated with prevention- versus promotion-focused regulatory style. Participants indicated their perceived accuracy (1 = “completely inaccurate” to 7 = “completely accurate”) of 12 statements measuring promotion focus (e.g., “My motto is ‘he who does not dare, does not win’” & “I follow my ideals”) and 12 statements measure prevention focus (e.g., “For important decisions, safety is important to me” & “For work and study, accuracy is important to me”). We averaged the promotion- ( $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = .58$ ) and prevention-focus ( $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = .58$ ) items separately. These measures were internally reliable ( $\alpha$ s were .77 & .90 respectively).

***Politics and religion.*** We measured political ideology using one question (Knight, 1999; Bananno & Jost, 2006): “Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Participants responded on a seven-point scale (1 = “extremely liberal to 7 = “extremely conservative”). The average was right in the middle of the scale ( $M = 3.37$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ). We also measured God-belief with one item, which has been used successfully in the past (e.g., Fetterman, 2017; van Elk, Rutjens, Pligt, & Harreveld, 2016): “To what extent do you believe in a god”. Participants responded on a five-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 5 = “fully and completely”). The average was a bit above the midpoint of the scale ( $M = 2.94$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ). It is important to point out that there are likely many atheist and liberal preppers.

***Positive/negative affect.*** Post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are primarily focused on a negative future. Even so, there is reason to believe that these beliefs might reflect low positive affect as well. The entire premise of these beliefs and motivations is about a hopeless world. That is, their worldview is a depressing one. According to Watson (2000), depression is like anxiety in that it includes a general negative affective component. However, unlike anxiety, depression includes feelings of low positive affect (Watson, 2000). As such, we predicted a positive correlation between negative affect and the PAPBS and its subscales. Additionally, we predict a negative correlation between positive affect and the PAPBS and its subscales. We measured positive and negative affect using varying versions of the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994). While the versions between the two samples were slightly different, the items for the general positive and negative affect factors were identical. We report only these factors here. Participants rated how much (1 = not at all or very little to 5 = extremely) they felt 10 positive affective states (e.g., “inspired” & “attentive”) and 10 negative affective states (e.g., “distressed” & “upset”). We created a positive affect score by averaging across positive items ( $M = 3.19$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ) and

negative affect score by averaging across negative items ( $M = 2.00$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ). These measures were internally reliable ( $\alpha$ s were .86 & .89 respectively).

***Moral dilemmas (US sample only).*** Participants responded to five classic moral dilemmas aimed at measuring deontologist (intuitive) versus consequentialist (rational, greater good) moral decision-making (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene, 2011). The following is an example item:

You are an inmate in a concentration camp. A sadistic guard is about to hang your son who tried to escape and wants you to pull the chair from underneath him. He says that if you don't he will not only kill your son but some other innocent inmate as well. You don't have any doubt that he means what he says. What would you do?

Participants could respond to this scenario with "I would pull the chair" (rational/consequentialist) or "I would NOT pull the chair" (intuitive/deontologist). The other scenarios had the same structure (e.g., the trolley dilemma). We coded deontological responses as "1" and consequentialist responses as "0", and then averaged across the items ( $M = 0.50$ ,  $SD = .30$ ). This measure showed acceptable internal consistency ( $\alpha = .61$ ).

***Other potentially related constructs.*** We were constructing the PAPBS at the same time that we were constructing other, not completely, unrelated measures. As such, instead of ignoring these measures, we include the relevant ones. The first was the Wrongness Admission Measure (Fetterman, Curtis, Carre, & Sassenberg, 2017). This ten-item measure is scenario-based and measures the likelihood that the respondent will admit when they are wrong, on a five-point scale (1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely). We averaged across the items and found it to be internally reliable ( $M = 3.77$ ,  $SD = .70$ ,  $\alpha = .86$ ). We predicted a negative correlation, as these post-apocalyptic and prepping beliefs are likely hard to change. The second potentially related

construct was resistance to persuasion (United States sample only). We included the Resistance to Persuasion measure (Briñol, Rucker, Tormala, & Petty, 2004) as a validation the wrongness admission measure, but thought it might be of relevance for the current study. Participants responded to 16-items (e.g., “I am strongly committed to my own beliefs” & “I find my opinions unchangeable”) on a five-point scale (1 = “extremely characteristic of you” to 5 = “extremely characteristic of you”). We averaged across the items and found it to be internally reliable ( $M = 3.18$ ,  $SD = .63$ ,  $\alpha = .90$ ).

The third potentially related construct was the construal of power as a responsibility (German sample only). This measure is based on research by Scholl and colleagues (for review see Sassenberg, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Scholl, 2014; Scholl, Ellemers, Sassenberg, & Scheepers, 2015) regarding the construal of power as a responsibility or opportunity. In the former case, people recognize that the power they have comes with the added responsibility and stressors of leading other people. As such, it is more communal in nature. In the latter case, people recognize their power as an opportunity to wield it over others and get what they want. In this case, we included a measure of power as responsibility (Scholl, Sassenberg, Scheepers, Ellemers, & de Wit, in press) and predicted negative correlation with the PAPBS and its subscales. Participants read a scenario in which their friend needs help. They then indicated their level of agreement (1 = “strongly disagree to 7 = “strongly agree) to five statements (e.g., “I feel I need to take care of others’ needs”). We averaged across items and found the measure to be reliable ( $M = 5.13$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ ,  $\alpha = .85$ ).

Finally, we included the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU: MacCann & Roberts, 2008) for purposes unrelated to the current goals, but deemed it of potential relevance (German sample only). We hesitantly predicted a negative correlation between the PAPBS, and

its subscales, and the STEU as there be some connection to emotional processing. Participants indicated which emotion (e.g., “guilty”, “distressed”, “sad”, “scared”, and “angry”) is most likely present in a set of 42 situational descriptions (e.g., “Something unpleasant is happening. Neither the person involved, nor anyone else, can stop it.”). Based on expert ratings (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008), we scored correct answers with a “1” and incorrect answers with a “0”. We averaged across the items to get an accuracy score for each participant and found an acceptable level of internal reliability ( $M = 0.62$ ,  $SD = 0.12$ ,  $\alpha = .73$ ).

## Study 2: Sample Size Determination

One might be concerned that the sample used for the CFA in Study 2 ( $n = 350$ ) is somewhat small compared to that used in other psychometric work. While we certainly appreciate that some readers may have this reaction, it is important to first note that we followed best practices to determine the sample size needed to adequately test a CFA of this scale (see Brown, 2015, p. 387; Muthen & Muthen, 2002). That is, we conducted a series of Monte Carlo simulations using MPlus software (version 7.4). It is important to note that these simulations were in fact quite labor-intensive to conduct; that researchers seldom go to this length to determine the proper sample size to collect; and that they are in fact more accurate than other, simpler “rules of thumb” used to determine sample size for confirmatory factor analysis (e.g., > 200 participants; 5-10 participants per freed parameter). These recommendations are themselves based on Monte Carlo simulations; and the problem is that they can be strongly affected by various characteristics of the model under considerations. Muthen and Muthen (2002) thus proposed that researchers can more accurately estimate the sample size needed for a given study by conducting a Monte Carlo simulation which tightly matches the conditions of the intended study.

In each simulation, Study 1’s results were used to specify all parameters of the model (i.e., factor-loadings, correlations between latent factors, etc.) in a simulated population. 10,000 samples of a given size (i.e., 200, 250, 300, & 350 participants) were then taken from this simulated population, and the model was applied to each sample. All parameters were then evaluated according to two criteria: 1) The bias in estimating each parameter and its standard error should be less than 10%; 2) coverage should be between 91% and 98%. Each parameter of substantive interest (i.e., each item’s factor loading, in this case) was also evaluated according



two additional criteria: 3) Bias in estimating the standard error should be less than 5%; and 4)

These parameters should statistically-significant in at least 80% of samples. Simulations

indicated that 350 participants were needed to satisfy these criteria and thus to test this model. As

such, the sample size used in Study 2 is quite adequate.

## Confirmatory Factor Analysis Using a Combined Sample

Despite the above-mentioned considerations, we recognize that some readers will be more convinced if we replicate our confirmatory factor analysis using a larger sample. An anonymous reviewer of this manuscript suggested that we conduct a confirmatory factor analysis on a larger dataset combining multiple samples. This would also ensure to invariance of the model across the different datasets. To ensure the independence of this analysis from the earlier exploratory factor analysis, we excluded Study 1 from the combined dataset; and included only Studies 2-6 (total  $n = 864$ ).

We first conducted a CFA in which participants from all five studies were treated as if they were from one, homogenous sample (i.e., a single-group CFA). All items were again specified to load onto their intended factor; and the error terms for two item (“Enough Resources” and “Scarce Resources”) were again allowed to correlate. When this was done, all items again strongly loaded onto their intended factor in the hypothesized direction (i.e., all loadings  $> |.50|$ ); and model fit was again adequate ( $\chi^2(40) = 224.80, p < .001$ ; RMSEA = .073; CFI = .94; SRMR = .04). This begins to suggest that the model was robust with larger sample sizes.

However, this first model assumes that all participants are drawn from a single population, which was not the case. We therefore next conducted a multi-group CFA. Participants from the five samples were treated as five different groups. We constrained each items’ factor loadings to be equivalent across each sample, as we expected these items to be equally strong markers of the underlying factor in all samples. We did not, however, fix the items’ intercepts to be equal across samples, as we explicitly expected prepping to be higher in some samples (e.g., Americans vs. Britons; “real” preppers vs. controls). When this was done, all

items continued to load significantly onto their respective models, and model fit was again adequate (as reported in footnote 3 of the main text) ( $\chi^2(232) = 457, p < .001$ ; RMSEA = .075; CFI = .93; SRMR = .076). This model in fact fit as well as a model in which factor loadings were allowed to vary across the five groups ( $\chi^2_{\text{diff}}(32) = 38.69, p = .19$ ).

A disadvantage of the multigroup CFA approach is that Studies 3-6 were not originally designed for use in a CFA, and thus their sample sizes are lower than would be desired for this purpose. Thus, it can be considered if anything quite impressive that fit continued to be adequate despite this.

### Study 3: Experimental Effects and Exploratory Mediations

#### Materials

**Writing manipulation.** We instructed participants to write for three minutes about one of two (“Doomsday” vs. “Camping”) topics. The instructions for the “Doomsday Prepping” condition read as follows:

On the following screen, we would like you to write, continuously, for 3 minutes about how you would prepare for a societal collapse or "doomsday" scenario. This societal collapse may be the result of a natural disaster, financial or economic collapse, war, an asteroid, or even a biblical apocalypse. No matter the cause, society will be without rules and humans will need to fend for themselves.

You might want to think about what supplies you’ll need, the availability resources after the event, how other people might behave, and what might be needed to ensure survival. You don’t need to write about all of these issues, we just included them for you to consider when writing about your preparation strategy.

The instructions for the “Camp/Hike Prepping” condition read as follows:

On the following screen, we would like you to write, continuously, for 3 minutes about how you would prepare for a two-week hike or camping trip. This camping or hiking trip may be to a national park, a desert hiking area, in the mountains, near a lake, the Appalachian Trail, or anywhere else in the US. No matter the location, you will be going on a trip and will need to fend for yourself.

You might want to think about what supplies you’ll need, the availability of resources at the location, how other people might prepare, and what might be needed to ensure

comfort. You don't need to write about all of these issues, we just included them for you to consider when writing about your preparation strategy.

We inspected the writing for content to ensure that the participants followed the instructions. Five participants did not follow the instructions and we removed them from further analysis.

## Results

### Prepper Mindset Manipulation

We submitted each of the measured variables, as dependent variables, to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Writing Condition (Doomsday Prepping vs. Camping/Hiking) as the between subject independent variables. First, predicted that Writing Condition would have an effect on PAPBS and its subscales scores. There was a significant effect on PA-Pessimism,  $F(1,127) = 7.69, p = .027, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .06, 95\% \text{ CI } [.004, .150]$ , such that scores were higher for those who wrote about Doomsday Prepping ( $M = 3.40, SD = .68$ ) than those who wrote about Camping/Hiking ( $M = 3.05, SD = .75$ ). Prepping Beliefs were also significantly, and more strongly, impacted by writing condition,  $F(1,127) = 12.43, p = .003, \eta^2_{\text{part}} = .09, 95\% \text{ CI } [.018, .193]$ , such that belief in the need to prep was higher for those who wrote about Doomsday Prepping ( $M = 3.37, SD = .79$ ) than those who wrote about Camping/Hiking ( $M = 2.88, SD = .79$ ). There were no condition effects on Human/Resources Concern, Social Darwinism, Current Prepping, or any of the other dependent variables ( $ps > .142$ ).

We also examined whether the writing manipulation had an indirect effect on the other outcome variables by increasing prepping beliefs. Therefore, we used Hayes' (2013) SAS PROCESS macro (Model 4 with 10000 bootstrap samples) to explore the indirect effect of Writing Condition on Current Prepping (intentions), God-belief, conservatism, cynicism,

conspiracy mentality, and SDO, through Prepping Beliefs (see Table below for pathway coefficients and indirect effects). Each of the indirect effects were significant. As such, we can speculate that only those whose prepping beliefs were impacted by writing about doomsday prepping versus camping, saw increases in current prepping (intentions), God-belief, conservatism, cynicism, conspiracy mentality, and SDO.


### Discussion

We were successful in activating a prepper-mindset. We were able to prime PA-Pessimism and beliefs in the need to prep, but our manipulation did not affect any other outcomes. Combined with our exploratory indirect models, these findings suggest that contemplating post-apocalyptic scenarios may not directly increase prepper-like beliefs, but it could increase one's belief that they need to start prepping which then could lead to increases in these outcomes.

DV	A Path	B Path	C Path	C' Path	95% CI for Indirect Effect
Current Prepping	.30**	.55**	.18*	.01	.040,.142
God-belief	.30**	.23**	-.07	-.16	.033,.269
Conservatism	.30**	.34*	.02	-.09	.072,.365
Cynicism	.30**	.32**	.10	.01	.035,.210
Conspiracy Mentality	.30**	.42**	.04	-.09	.117,.477
SDO	.30**	.32**	.02	-.09	.046,.245

Note: Standardized regression coefficients are depicted for each path (\* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ ). "A Path" = Condition to Mediator; "B Path" = Mediator to Outcome; "C Path" = Condition to Outcome; "C' Path" = Condition to Outcome controlling for the mediator.

**Daily Prepping Thoughts Pattern Across Days by Candidate Support, Study 5**



NOTE: Day 10 was the day after the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States.

## **Studies 1a & 1b: Full Correlation Matrix**



	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PreppingBeliefs	God_Belief	Conservatism	SDO	Humility	Neuroticism	Extraversion	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Openness	Promotion	Prevention	PA	NA	Paranoid	Dilemma	PowerAsResponsibility	WAW	ResistPersuasion	STEU
PA_Pessim	1.00000 234	0.75714 <.0001 234	0.67739 <.0001 234	0.72441 <.0001 234	0.14074 0.0421 209	0.33448 <.0001 209	0.25454 0.0002 208	-0.29028 <.0001 214	0.18072 0.0080 214	-0.29629 <.0001 214	-0.25742 0.0001 214	-0.12837 0.0608 214	-0.25984 0.0001 214	-0.21858 0.0244 106	0.03355 0.7328 106	-0.17420 0.0114 210	0.09188 0.1847 210	0.31843 0.0009 105	-0.03854 0.6977 104	-0.10185 0.2489 130	-0.14946 0.0222 234	0.16674 0.0907 104	-0.06293 0.5003 117
HumNat_Res	0.75714 <.0001 234	1.00000 234	0.36912 <.0001 234	0.24581 0.0001 234	0.02607 0.7079 209	0.19978 0.0037 209	0.05332 0.4443 208	-0.19461 0.0043 214	0.24233 0.0003 214	-0.21675 0.0014 214	-0.20074 0.0032 214	-0.07054 0.3044 214	-0.12701 0.0637 214	-0.11520 0.2396 106	0.07335 0.4549 106	-0.11084 0.1093 210	0.16579 0.0162 210	0.13633 0.1655 105	0.02657 0.7889 104	-0.08031 0.3637 130	-0.13879 0.0338 234	0.10706 0.2794 104	0.14185 0.1271 117
SocDar	0.67739 <.0001 234	0.36912 <.0001 234	1.00000 234	0.23438 0.0003 234	-0.01279 0.8542 209	0.18058 0.0089 208	0.41909 <.0001 208	-0.34678 <.0001 214	0.03960 0.5645 214	-0.24205 0.0004 214	-0.33463 <.0001 214	-0.19533 0.0041 214	-0.32848 <.0001 214	-0.15221 0.1193 106	-0.10091 0.3034 106	-0.13597 0.0491 210	0.07695 0.2670 210	0.29006 0.0027 105	-0.13017 0.1878 104	-0.22475 0.0101 130	-0.33037 <.0001 234	0.17279 0.0794 104	-0.17772 0.0552 117
PreppingBeliefs	0.72441 <.0001 234	0.24581 0.0001 234	0.23438 0.0003 234	1.00000 234	0.25524 0.0002 209	0.31916 <.0001 209	0.13080 0.0597 208	-0.11996 0.0800 214	0.08606 0.2099 214	-0.18668 0.0062 214	-0.05926 0.3884 214	-0.03741 0.5862 214	-0.13994 0.0408 214	-0.19376 0.0466 106	0.07308 0.4566 106	-0.13079 0.0585 210	-0.03962 0.5680 210	0.24912 0.0104 105	-0.00905 0.9274 104	0.05180 0.5583 130	0.08281 0.2069 234	0.10956 0.2682 104	-0.12540 0.1779 117
God_Belief	0.14074 0.0421 209	0.02607 0.7079 209	-0.01279 0.8542 209	0.25524 0.0002 209	1.00000 209	0.43151 <.0001 209	0.06216 0.3724 208	0.13342 0.0541 209	0.00717 0.9180 209	0.06772 0.3299 209	0.12688 0.0672 209	0.14848 0.0319 209	-0.08718 0.2094 209	0.08280 0.4010 105	0.21199 0.0299 105	0.10682 0.1237 209	-0.05385 0.4387 209	0.07904 0.4229 105	0.16875 0.0868 104	-0.12809 0.1929 105	0.07437 0.2845 209	0.23211 0.0177 104	-0.17035 0.0823 105
Conservatism	0.33448 <.0001 209	0.19978 0.0037 209	0.18058 0.0089 209	0.31916 <.0001 209	0.43151 <.0001 209	1.00000 209	0.42673 <.0001 208	0.06192 0.3731 209	-0.01976 0.7765 209	-0.13313 0.0546 209	-0.02944 0.6722 209	0.11953 0.0847 209	-0.37942 <.0001 209	-0.09198 0.3507 105	0.18659 0.0567 105	0.00354 0.9595 209	-0.05069 0.4661 209	0.10925 0.2673 105	0.13120 0.1843 104	-0.08397 0.3944 105	0.03918 0.5733 209	0.22883 0.0195 104	0.04880 0.6210 105
SDO	0.25454 0.0002 208	0.05332 0.4443 208	0.41909 <.0001 208	0.13080 0.0597 208	0.06216 0.3724 208	0.42673 <.0001 208	1.00000 208	-0.23238 0.0007 208	-0.17467 0.0116 208	-0.03807 0.5851 208	-0.18767 0.0066 208	-0.07097 0.3084 208	-0.29397 <.0001 208	-0.14948 0.1280 105	-0.09087 0.3566 105	-0.04430 0.5252 208	0.00867 0.9011 208	0.37970 <.0001 105	-0.07851 0.4305 103	-0.18672 0.0565 105	-0.15836 0.0223 208	0.12614 0.2042 103	-0.15229 0.1209 105
Humility	-0.29028 <.0001 214	-0.19461 0.0043 214	-0.34678 <.0001 214	-0.11996 0.0800 214	0.13342 0.0541 209	0.06192 0.3731 209	-0.23238 0.0007 208	1.00000 214	0.07102 0.3011 214	0.13643 0.0462 214	0.22868 0.0008 214	0.27534 <.0001 214	0.07617 0.2673 214	-0.05026 0.6089 106	0.11541 0.2388 106	0.10600 0.1257 210	-0.14573 0.0348 210	-0.29955 0.0019 105	0.31454 0.0011 104	0.09663 0.3153 110	0.22171 0.0011 214	-0.06727 0.4974 104	0.07802 0.4179 110
Neuroticism	0.18072 0.0080 214	0.24233 0.0003 214	0.03960 0.5645 214	0.08606 0.2099 214	0.00717 0.9180 209	-0.01976 0.7765 209	-0.17467 0.0116 208	0.07102 0.3011 214	1.00000 214	-0.32165 <.0001 214	-0.17781 0.0091 214	-0.03363 0.6247 214	-0.11741 0.0866 214	-0.25297 0.0089 106	0.27235 0.0047 106	-0.18185 0.0083 210	0.28105 0.6115 105	0.05014 0.6115 105	0.23987 0.0142 104	0.18876 0.0483 110	-0.01784 0.7953 214	-0.17248 0.0800 104	-0.01055 0.9129 110
Extraversion	-0.29629 <.0001 214	-0.21675 0.0014 214	-0.24205 0.0004 214	-0.18668 0.0062 214	0.06772 0.3299 209	-0.13313 0.0546 209	-0.03807 0.5851 208	0.13643 0.0462 214	-0.32165 <.0001 214	1.00000 214	0.27310 <.0001 214	0.20144 0.0031 214	0.17047 0.0125 214	0.45709 <.0001 106	0.04693 0.6328 106	0.54110 <.0001 210	-0.33603 <.0001 210	-0.39873 <.0001 105	0.07774 0.4328 104	0.10952 0.2547 110	0.04746 0.4898 214	0.22203 0.0235 104	-0.08205 0.3941 110
Agreeableness	-0.25742 0.0001 214	-0.20074 0.0032 214	-0.33463 <.0001 214	-0.05926 0.3884 214	0.12688 0.0672 209	-0.02944 0.6722 209	-0.18767 0.0066 208	0.22868 0.0008 214	-0.17781 0.0091 214	0.27310 <.0001 214	1.00000 214	0.10169 0.1381 214	0.18714 0.0060 214	0.24070 0.0129 106	-0.09761 0.3196 106	0.27758 <.0001 210	-0.26334 0.0001 210	-0.25466 0.0088 105	0.11784 0.2335 104	0.22632 0.0174 110	0.35784 <.0001 214	-0.24536 0.0121 104	0.04344 0.6523 110
Conscientiousness	-0.12837 0.0608 214	-0.07054 0.3044 214	-0.19533 0.0041 214	-0.03741 0.5862 214	0.14848 0.0319 209	0.11953 0.0847 209	-0.07097 0.3084 208	0.27534 <.0001 214	-0.03363 0.6247 214	0.20144 0.0031 214	0.10169 0.1381 214	1.00000 214	0.15857 0.0203 214	0.30197 0.0017 106	0.62497 <.0001 106	0.38905 <.0001 210	-0.16031 0.0201 210	0.04828 0.6248 105	0.10000 0.3125 104	0.07198 0.4549 110	0.12708 0.0635 214	0.17161 0.0815 104	0.19351 0.0428 110
Openness	-0.25984 0.0001 214	-0.12701 0.0637 214	-0.32848 <.0001 214	-0.13994 0.0408 214	-0.08718 0.2094 209	-0.37942 <.0001 209	-0.29397 <.0001 208	0.07617 0.2673 214	-0.11741 0.0866 214	0.17047 0.0125 214	0.18714 0.0060 214	0.15857 0.0203 214	1.00000 214	0.34965 0.0002 106	0.12066 0.2179 106	0.23837 0.0005 210	0.09133 0.1874 210	-0.12327 0.2103 105	-0.14662 0.1375 104	0.24671 0.0094 110	0.16277 0.0172 214	-0.22923 0.0192 104	0.20357 0.0329 110
Promotion	-0.21858 0.0244 106	-0.11520 0.2396 106	-0.15221 0.1193 106	-0.19376 0.0466 106	0.08280 0.4010 105	-0.09198 0.3507 105	-0.14948 0.1280 105	-0.05026 0.6089 106	-0.25297 0.0089 106	0.45709 <.0001 106	0.24070 0.0129 106	0.30197 0.0017 106	0.34965 0.0002 106	1.00000 106	0.34207 0.0003 106	0.59976 <.0001 106	-0.19255 0.0480 106	-0.09475 0.3363 105	.	0.02886 0.7690 106	0.08171 0.4050 106	.	0.09189 0.3488 106
Prevention	0.03355 0.7328 106	0.07335 0.4549 106	-0.10091 0.3034 106	0.07308 0.4566 106	0.21199 0.0299 105	0.18659 0.0567 105	-0.09087 0.3566 105	0.11541 0.2388 106	0.27235 0.0047 106	0.04693 0.6328 106	-0.09761 0.3196 106	0.62497 <.0001 106	0.12066 0.2179 106	0.34207 0.0003 106	1.00000 106	0.19494 0.0452 106	-0.01288 0.8957 106	-0.00178 0.9856 105	.	0.10433 0.2872 106	0.10729 0.2736 106	.	0.14005 0.1522 106
PA	-0.17420 0.0114 210	-0.11084 0.1093 210	-0.13597 0.0491 210	-0.13079 0.0585 210	0.10682 0.1237 209	0.00354 0.9595 209	-0.04430 0.5252 208	0.10600 0.1257 210	-0.18185 0.0083 210	0.54110 <.0001 210	0.27758 <.0001 210	0.38905 <.0001 210	0.23837 0.0005 210	0.59976 <.0001 106	0.19494 0.0452 106	1.00000 210	-0.09530 0.1688 210	-0.01556 0.8748 105	0.10773 0.2764 104	0.23612 0.0148 106	0.07090 0.3065 210	0.07127 0.4722 104	-0.03921 0.6898 106
NA	0.09188 0.1847 210	0.16579 0.0162 210	0.07695 0.2670 210	-0.03962 0.5680 210	-0.05385 0.4387 209	-0.05069 0.4661 209	0.00867 0.9011 208	-0.14573 0.0348 210	0.28105 <.0001 210	-0.33603 <.0001 210	-0.26334 0.0001 210	-0.16031 0.0201 210	0.09133 0.1874 210	-0.19255 0.0480 106	-0.01288 0.8957 106	-0.09530 0.1688 210	1.00000 210	0.47955 <.0001 105	-0.06020 0.5438 104	0.10407 0.2884 106	-0.10772 0.1197 210	-0.17415 0.0770 104	-0.08743 0.3728 106
Paranoid	0.31843 0.0009 105	0.13633 0.1655 105	0.29006 0.0027 105	0.24912 0.0104 105	0.07904 0.4229 105	0.10925 0.2673 105	0.37970 <.0001 105	-0.29955 0.0019 105	0.05014 0.6115 105	-0.39873 <.0001 105	-0.25466 0.0088 105	0.04828 0.6248 105	-0.12327 0.2103 105	-0.09475 0.3363 105	-0.00178 0.9856 105	-0.01556 0.8748 105	0.47955 <.0001 105	1.00000 105	.	-0.07222 0.4641 105	-0.15192 0.1218 105	.	-0.10956 0.2659 105
Dilemma	-0.03854 0.6977 104	0.02657 0.7889 104	-0.13017 0.1878 104	-0.00905 0.9274 104	0.16875 0.0868 104	0.13120 0.1843 104	-0.07851 0.4305 103	0.31454 0.0011 104	0.23987 0.0142 104	0.07774 0.4328 104	0.11784 0.2335 104	0.10000 0.3125 104	-0.14662 0.1375 104	.	.	0.10773 0.2764 104	-0.06020 0.5438 104	.	1.00000 104	.	0.03640 0.7138 104	0.07677 0.4386 104	.
PowerAsResponsibility	-0.10185 0.2489 130	-0.08031 0.3637 130	-0.22475 0.0101 130	0.05180 0.5583 130	-0.12809 0.1929 105	-0.08397 0.3944 105	-0.18672 0.0565 105	0.09663 0.3153 110	0.18876 0.0483 110	0.10952 0.2547 110	0.22632 0.0174 110	0.07198 0.4549 110	0.24671 0.0094 110	0.02886 0.7690 106	0.10433 0.2872 106	0.23612 0.0148 106	0.10407 0.2884 106	-0.07222 0.4641 105	.	0.00000 130	0.28727 0.0009 130	.	0.28851 0.0016 117
WAW	-0.14946 0.0222 234	-0.13879 0.0338 234	-0.33037 <.0001 234	0.08281 0.2069 234	0.07437 0.2845 209	0.03918 0.5733 209	-0.15836 0.0223 208	0.22171 0.0011 214	-0.01784 0.7953 214	0.04746 0.4898 214	0.35784 <.0001 214	0.12708 0.0635 214	0.16277 0.0172 214	0.08171 0.4050 106	0.10729 0.2736 106	0.07090 0.3065 210	-0.10772 0.1197 210	-0.15192 0.1218 105	0.03640 0.7138 104	0.28727 0.0009 130	1.00000 234	-0.23301 0.0173 104	0.21006 0.0230 117
ResistPersuasion	0.16674 0.0907 104	0.10706 0.2794 104	0.17279 0.0794 104	0.10956 0.2682 104	0.23211 0.0177 104	0.22883 0.0195 104	0.12614 0.2042 103	-0.06727 0.4974 104	-0														

### **Study 3: Full Correlation Matrix**

	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PreppingBeliefs	PreppingBehavior	PBS	FishHarvest	God	Conserv	Cynic	Conspiracy	SDO
PA_Pessim	1.00000	0.87540	0.82429	0.80907	0.39592	-0.11728	0.18460	0.12431	0.21730	0.51740	0.46481	0.32918
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.1891 127	0.0377 127	0.1621 128	0.0137 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0001 128
HumNat_Res	0.87540	1.00000	0.63590	0.53232	0.23199	-0.06333	0.14463	0.07846	0.10143	0.53182	0.43356	0.16141
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0084 128	0.4793 127	0.1047 127	0.3787 128	0.2546 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0687 128
SocDar	0.82429	0.63590	1.00000	0.48330	0.19939	-0.06920	0.20287	-0.01144	0.09533	0.44007	0.30205	0.36669
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0240 128	0.4395 127	0.0222 127	0.8980 128	0.2844 128	<.0001 128	0.0005 128	<.0001 128
PreppingBeliefs	0.80907	0.53232	0.48330	1.00000	0.55164	-0.16005	0.12442	0.23074	0.34252	0.32272	0.41719	0.31982
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0723 127	0.1634 127	0.0088 128	<.0001 128	0.0002 128	<.0001 128	0.0002 128
PreppingBehavior	0.39592	0.23199	0.19939	0.55164	1.00000	-0.14583	-0.00757	0.21510	0.19861	0.20038	0.15486	0.24840
	<.0001 128	0.0084 128	0.0240 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.1019 127	0.9327 127	0.0148 128	0.0246 128	0.0233 128	0.0809 128	0.0047 128
PBS	-0.11728	-0.06333	-0.06920	-0.16005	-0.14583	1.00000	-0.04463	-0.11465	0.03842	-0.06611	-0.19352	-0.12196
	0.1891 127	0.4793 127	0.4395 127	0.0723 127	0.1019 127	<.0001 127	0.6198 126	0.1993 127	0.6681 127	0.4602 127	0.0293 127	0.1719 127
FishHarvest	0.18460	0.14463	0.20287	0.12442	-0.00757	-0.04463	1.00000	-0.02238	0.06885	0.14232	-0.03763	0.28109
	0.0377 127	0.1047 127	0.0222 127	0.1634 127	0.9327 127	0.6198 126	<.0001 127	0.8028 127	0.4418 127	0.1104 127	0.6744 127	0.0014 127
God	0.12431	0.07846	-0.01144	0.23074	0.21510	-0.11465	-0.02238	1.00000	0.47048	-0.04913	0.11195	0.23101
	0.1621 128	0.3787 128	0.8980 128	0.0088 128	0.0148 128	0.1993 127	0.8028 127	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.5818 128	0.2083 128	0.0087 128
Conserv	0.21730	0.10143	0.09533	0.34252	0.19861	0.03842	0.06885	0.47048	1.00000	0.03014	-0.03346	0.52191
	0.0137 128	0.2546 128	0.2844 128	<.0001 128	0.0246 128	0.6681 127	0.4418 127	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.7355 128	0.7077 128	<.0001 128
Cynic	0.51740	0.53182	0.44007	0.32272	0.20038	-0.06611	0.14232	-0.04913	0.03014	1.00000	0.36668	0.21455
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0002 128	0.0233 128	0.4602 127	0.1104 127	0.5818 128	0.7355 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0150 128
Conspiracy	0.46481	0.43356	0.30205	0.41719	0.15486	-0.19352	-0.03763	0.11195	-0.03346	0.36668	1.00000	-0.03575
	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.0005 128	<.0001 128	0.0809 128	0.0293 127	0.6744 127	0.2083 128	0.7077 128	<.0001 128	<.0001 128	0.6887 128
SDO	0.32918	0.16141	0.36669	0.31982	0.24840	-0.12196	0.28109	0.23101	0.52191	0.21455	-0.03575	1.00000
	0.0001 128	0.0687 128	<.0001 128	0.0002 128	0.0047 128	0.1719 127	0.0014 127	0.0087 128	<.0001 128	0.0150 128	0.6887 128	<.0001 128

## **Study 4: Full Correlation Matrix**

	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PrepperBeliefs	PrepperBehavior	NegEmo	PosEmo	Stress	Depress	Cynic	Conspir	PosEvent	NegEvent	Weapon	Prep	Meaning	Resentful	ProSoc	Death
PA_Pessim	1.00000	0.80546	0.75106	0.67247	0.23111	0.04479	-0.11241	0.19498	0.05316	0.23885	0.31345	-0.11569	0.17238	0.27392	0.45824	-0.12834	0.14640	-0.04599	0.09988
	<.0001 90	<.0001 90	<.0001 90	<.0001 90	0.0284 90	0.6858 84	0.3087 84	0.0755 84	0.6311 84	0.0287 84	0.0037 84	0.2947 84	0.1169 84	0.0117 84	<.0001 84	0.2447 84	0.1839 84	0.6778 84	0.3660 84
HumNat_Res	0.80546	1.00000	0.49609	0.24460	0.07716	0.14167	-0.14426	0.26309	0.04463	0.30664	0.24883	-0.14954	0.21251	0.25158	0.32500	-0.14036	0.21840	-0.09987	0.07598
	<.0001 90	90	<.0001 90	0.0202 90	0.4698 90	0.1986 84	0.1905 84	0.0156 84	0.6868 84	0.0046 84	0.0225 84	0.1746 84	0.0523 84	0.0210 84	0.0026 84	0.2028 84	0.0459 84	0.3661 84	0.4922 84
SocDar	0.75106	0.49609	1.00000	0.25179	0.12892	0.00208	-0.19002	0.07648	0.06793	0.13531	0.26206	-0.19959	0.10340	0.13899	0.38411	-0.11995	0.09046	-0.15818	-0.06024
	<.0001 90	<.0001 90	90	0.0167 90	0.2259 90	0.9850 84	0.0834 84	0.4893 84	0.5392 84	0.2197 84	0.0160 84	0.0687 84	0.3493 84	0.2074 84	0.0003 84	0.2771 84	0.4131 84	0.1507 84	0.5862 84
PrepperBeliefs	0.67247	0.24460	0.25179	1.00000	0.31495	-0.06023	0.07430	0.07371	0.00992	0.07204	0.19313	0.08110	0.05685	0.20791	0.32465	-0.02539	0.00381	0.14479	0.18839
	<.0001 90	0.0202 90	0.0167 90	90	0.0025 90	0.5863 84	0.5018 84	0.5052 84	0.9287 84	0.5149 84	0.0784 84	0.4633 84	0.6075 84	0.0577 84	0.0026 84	0.8187 84	0.9726 84	0.1888 84	0.0861 84
PrepperBehavior	0.23111	0.07716	0.12892	0.31495	1.00000	-0.14289	0.14174	-0.17330	-0.14387	-0.04351	0.09059	0.20133	-0.08140	0.19115	0.35010	0.17998	-0.10689	0.20281	0.29501
	0.0284 90	0.4698 90	0.2259 90	0.0025 90	90	0.1947 84	0.1984 84	0.1149 84	0.1917 84	0.6943 84	0.4125 84	0.0663 84	0.4617 84	0.0815 84	0.0011 84	0.1014 84	0.3332 84	0.0643 84	0.0064 84
NegEmo	0.04479	0.14167	0.00208	-0.06023	-0.14289	1.00000	-0.53980	0.65663	0.81761	0.59436	0.32124	-0.46521	0.65162	0.09121	0.14176	-0.59065	0.48178	-0.24880	0.33728
	0.6858 84	0.1986 84	0.9850 84	0.5863 84	0.1947 84	84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0029 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.4093 84	0.1983 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0225 84	0.0017 84
PosEmo	-0.11241	-0.14426	-0.19002	0.07430	0.14174	-0.53980	1.00000	-0.30994	-0.50650	-0.26748	-0.20403	0.73485	-0.43949	-0.16348	-0.14276	0.51224	-0.37243	0.39772	-0.15824
	0.3087 84	0.1905 84	0.0834 84	0.5018 84	0.1984 84	<.0001 84	84	0.0041 84	<.0001 84	0.0139 84	0.0627 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.1373 84	0.1952 84	<.0001 84	0.0005 84	0.0002 84	0.1505 84
Stress	0.19498	0.26309	0.07648	0.07371	-0.17330	0.65663	-0.30994	1.00000	0.63753	0.48486	0.32619	-0.31278	0.54422	0.22015	0.08210	-0.38472	0.45951	-0.11163	0.19170
	0.0755 84	0.0156 84	0.4893 84	0.5052 84	0.1149 84	<.0001 84	0.0041 84	84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0025 84	0.0038 84	<.0001 84	0.0442 84	0.4578 84	0.0003 84	<.0001 84	0.3121 84	0.0807 84
Depress	0.05316	0.04463	0.06793	0.00992	-0.14387	0.81761	-0.50650	0.63753	1.00000	0.61725	0.40265	-0.38947	0.59015	0.23014	0.20644	-0.56982	0.54743	-0.20039	0.43212
	0.6311 84	0.6868 84	0.5392 84	0.9287 84	0.1917 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	84	<.0001 84	0.0001 84	0.0003 84	<.0001 84	0.0352 84	0.0596 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0676 84	<.0001 84
Cynic	0.23885	0.30664	0.13531	0.07204	-0.04351	0.59436	-0.26748	0.48486	0.61725	1.00000	0.48158	-0.15175	0.55980	0.31993	0.32201	-0.32780	0.54249	0.02027	0.41296
	0.0287 84	0.0046 84	0.2197 84	0.5149 84	0.6943 84	<.0001 84	0.0139 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	84	<.0001 84	0.1682 84	<.0001 84	0.0030 84	0.0028 84	0.0023 84	<.0001 84	0.8548 84	<.0001 84
Conspir	0.31345	0.24883	0.26206	0.19313	0.09059	0.32124	-0.20403	0.32619	0.40265	0.48158	1.00000	-0.08602	0.26192	0.46024	0.41321	-0.27988	0.35928	-0.01854	0.26393
	0.0037 84	0.0225 84	0.0160 84	0.0784 84	0.4125 84	0.0029 84	0.0627 84	0.0025 84	0.0001 84	<.0001 84	84	0.4365 84	0.0161 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0099 84	0.0008 84	0.8671 84	0.0153 84
PosEvent	-0.11569	-0.14954	-0.19959	0.08110	0.20133	-0.46521	0.73485	-0.31278	-0.38947	-0.15175	-0.08602	1.00000	-0.34466	-0.10702	-0.12303	0.60409	-0.27513	0.45558	-0.02522
	0.2947 84	0.1746 84	0.0687 84	0.4633 84	0.0663 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0038 84	0.0003 84	0.1682 84	0.4365 84	84	0.0013 84	0.3326 84	0.2649 84	<.0001 84	0.0113 84	<.0001 84	0.8199 84
NegEvent	0.17238	0.21251	0.10340	0.05685	-0.08140	0.65162	-0.43949	0.54422	0.59015	0.55980	0.26192	-0.34466	1.00000	0.08606	0.10266	-0.51146	0.39891	-0.14628	0.34624
	0.1169 84	0.0523 84	0.3493 84	0.6075 84	0.4617 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0161 84	0.0013 84	84	0.4363 84	0.3528 84	<.0001 84	0.0002 84	0.1843 84	0.0013 84
Weapon	0.27392	0.25158	0.13899	0.20791	0.19115	0.09121	-0.16348	0.22015	0.23014	0.31993	0.46024	-0.10702	0.08606	1.00000	0.49199	-0.12380	0.46528	0.08795	0.31686
	0.0117 84	0.0210 84	0.2074 84	0.0577 84	0.0815 84	0.4093 84	0.1373 84	0.0442 84	0.0352 84	0.0030 84	<.0001 84	0.3326 84	0.4363 84	84	<.0001 84	0.2619 84	<.0001 84	0.4263 84	0.0033 84
Prep	0.45824	0.32500	0.38411	0.32465	0.35010	0.14176	-0.14276	0.08210	0.20644	0.32201	0.41321	-0.12303	0.10266	0.49199	1.00000	-0.08781	0.28917	0.02863	0.41265
	<.0001 84	0.0026 84	0.0003 84	0.0026 84	0.0011 84	0.1983 84	0.1952 84	0.4578 84	0.0596 84	0.0028 84	<.0001 84	0.2649 84	0.3528 84	<.0001 84	84	0.4271 84	0.0076 84	0.7960 84	<.0001 84
Meaning	-0.12834	-0.14036	-0.11995	-0.02539	0.17998	-0.59065	0.51224	-0.38472	-0.56982	-0.32780	-0.27988	0.60409	-0.51146	-0.12380	-0.08781	1.00000	-0.36108	0.45691	-0.06091
	0.2447 84	0.2028 84	0.2771 84	0.8187 84	0.1014 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0003 84	<.0001 84	0.0023 84	0.0099 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.2619 84	0.4271 84	84	0.0007 84	<.0001 84	0.5821 84
Resentful	0.14640	0.21840	0.09046	0.00381	-0.10689	0.48178	-0.37243	0.45951	0.54743	0.54249	0.35928	-0.27513	0.39891	0.46528	0.28917	-0.36108	1.00000	-0.06605	0.34802
	0.1839 84	0.0459 84	0.4131 84	0.9726 84	0.3332 84	<.0001 84	0.0005 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0008 84	0.0113 84	0.0002 84	<.0001 84	0.0076 84	0.0007 84	84	0.5505 84	0.0012 84
ProSoc	-0.04599	-0.09987	-0.15818	0.14479	0.20281	-0.24880	0.39772	-0.11163	-0.20039	0.02027	-0.01854	0.45558	-0.14628	0.08795	0.02863	0.45691	-0.06605	1.00000	0.17276
	0.6778 84	0.3661 84	0.1507 84	0.1888 84	0.0643 84	0.0225 84	0.0002 84	0.3121 84	0.0676 84	0.8548 84	0.8671 84	<.0001 84	0.1843 84	0.4263 84	0.7960 84	<.0001 84	0.5505 84	84	0.1161 84
Death	0.09988	0.07598	-0.06024	0.18839	0.29501	0.33728	-0.15824	0.19170	0.43212	0.41296	0.26393	-0.02522	0.34624	0.31686	0.41265	-0.06091	0.34802	0.17276	1.00000
	0.3660 84	0.4922 84	0.5862 84	0.0861 84	0.0064 84	0.0017 84	0.1505 84	0.0807 84	<.0001 84	<.0001 84	0.0153 84	0.8199 84	0.0013 84	0.0033 84	<.0001 84	0.5821 84	0.0012 84	0.1161 84	84

## **Study 5: Full Correlation Matrix**

	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PrepperBeliefs	PrepperBehavior	Affect	Arous	Stressed	Depressed	Cynicism	Mntrd	Angry	Meaning	Ambig	Uncertain	GoodHapp	BadHapp	Prep	Death	Weapon
PA_Pessim	1.00000 137	0.77967 <.0001 137	0.68344 <.0001 137	0.67527 <.0001 137	0.13697 0.1105 137	-0.16179 0.0775 120	0.03614 0.6951 120	0.05971 0.5171 120	0.16866 0.0656 120	0.32089 0.0004 120	0.12531 0.1727 120	0.19569 0.0322 120	-0.00718 0.9379 120	0.12046 0.1900 120	0.10089 0.2729 120	-0.00702 0.9393 120	0.00144 0.9875 120	0.37241 <.0001 120	0.27891 0.0020 120	0.13027 0.1561 120
HumNat_Res	0.77967 <.0001 137	1.00000 137	0.36681 <.0001 137	0.27684 0.0011 137	-0.03851 0.6550 137	-0.14645 0.1105 120	-0.01318 0.8864 120	0.11560 0.2086 120	0.18086 0.0481 120	0.21480 0.0185 120	-0.01135 0.9021 120	0.15967 0.0815 120	-0.09126 0.3215 120	0.11874 0.1965 120	0.14253 0.1204 120	-0.07663 0.4055 120	-0.00469 0.9595 120	0.31834 0.0004 120	0.24574 0.0068 120	0.21486 0.0184 120
SocDar	0.68344 <.0001 137	0.36681 <.0001 137	1.00000 137	0.14519 0.0905 137	-0.04185 0.6273 137	-0.12113 0.1875 120	0.03602 0.6961 120	0.23924 0.0085 120	0.15308 0.0951 120	0.32241 0.0003 120	0.18262 0.0459 120	0.26784 0.0031 120	-0.06016 0.5139 120	0.20043 0.0282 120	0.16741 0.0676 120	-0.04685 0.6114 120	0.08553 0.3530 120	0.19903 0.0293 120	0.16440 0.0728 120	0.08834 0.3373 120
PrepperBeliefs	0.67527 <.0001 137	0.27684 0.0011 137	0.14519 0.0905 137	1.00000 137	0.36474 <.0001 137	-0.07579 0.4107 120	0.05582 0.5448 120	-0.21567 0.0180 120	0.02516 0.7850 120	0.15197 0.0975 120	0.10472 0.2550 120	-0.00284 0.9754 120	0.13460 0.1427 120	-0.05575 0.5453 120	-0.09057 0.3252 120	0.10756 0.2423 120	-0.07145 0.4380 120	0.26770 0.0031 120	0.17873 0.0508 120	-0.03017 0.7436 120
PrepperBehavior	0.13697 0.1105 137	-0.03851 0.6550 137	-0.04185 0.6273 137	0.36474 <.0001 137	1.00000 137	-0.04743 0.6069 120	0.20379 0.0256 120	-0.13943 0.1288 120	-0.06231 0.4990 120	0.08041 0.3826 120	0.07323 0.4267 120	0.03461 0.7075 120	-0.03542 0.7009 120	-0.06420 0.4860 120	-0.10721 0.2438 120	0.04965 0.5902 120	-0.00362 0.9687 120	0.28202 0.0018 120	0.03244 0.7251 120	0.18039 0.0487 120
Affect	-0.16179 0.0775 120	-0.14645 0.1105 120	-0.12113 0.1875 120	-0.07579 0.4107 120	-0.04743 0.6069 120	1.00000 125	0.10691 0.2353 125	-0.42641 <.0001 125	-0.67932 <.0001 125	-0.39126 <.0001 125	-0.11023 0.2211 125	-0.44186 <.0001 125	0.36687 <.0001 125	-0.27209 0.0021 125	-0.55881 <.0001 125	0.38271 <.0001 125	-0.41579 <.0001 125	-0.02804 0.7563 125	-0.16018 0.0744 125	-0.02777 0.7585 125
Arous	0.03614 0.6951 120	-0.01318 0.8864 120	0.03602 0.6961 120	0.05582 0.5448 120	0.20379 0.0256 120	0.10691 0.2353 125	1.00000 125	0.03514 0.6972 125	-0.01114 0.9018 125	0.01214 0.8931 125	0.12617 0.1609 125	0.03830 0.6716 125	0.10047 0.2649 125	0.14390 0.1094 125	-0.04231 0.6394 125	0.04620 0.6089 125	0.10764 0.2322 125	0.20638 0.0209 125	-0.01640 0.8559 125	0.01684 0.8521 125
Stressed	0.05971 0.5171 120	0.11560 0.2086 120	0.23924 0.0085 120	-0.21567 0.0180 120	-0.13943 0.1288 120	-0.42641 <.0001 125	0.03514 0.6972 125	1.00000 125	0.52236 <.0001 125	0.34213 <.0001 125	0.07417 0.4111 125	0.46234 <.0001 125	-0.21419 0.0165 125	0.37343 <.0001 125	0.54851 <.0001 125	-0.21094 0.0182 125	0.37861 <.0001 125	0.06997 0.4381 125	0.08362 0.3539 125	-0.05956 0.5094 125
Depressed	0.16866 0.0656 120	0.18086 0.0481 120	0.15308 0.0951 120	0.02516 0.7850 120	-0.06231 0.4990 120	-0.67932 <.0001 125	-0.01114 0.9018 125	0.52236 <.0001 125	1.00000 125	0.47763 <.0001 125	0.29763 0.0007 125	0.57392 <.0001 125	-0.38803 <.0001 125	0.48346 <.0001 125	0.64816 <.0001 125	-0.39124 <.0001 125	0.63709 <.0001 125	0.15848 0.0775 125	0.23802 0.0075 125	0.08611 0.3396 125
Cynicism	0.32089 0.0004 120	0.21480 0.0185 120	0.32241 0.0003 120	0.15197 0.0975 120	0.08041 0.3826 120	-0.39126 <.0001 125	0.01214 0.8931 125	0.34213 <.0001 125	0.47763 <.0001 125	1.00000 125	0.40071 <.0001 125	0.46926 <.0001 125	-0.06520 0.4700 125	0.50485 <.0001 125	0.50430 <.0001 125	-0.11367 0.2069 125	0.35457 <.0001 125	0.43000 <.0001 125	0.26898 0.0024 125	0.28290 0.0014 125
Mntrd	0.12531 0.1727 120	-0.01135 0.9021 120	0.18262 0.0459 120	0.10472 0.2550 120	0.07323 0.4267 120	-0.11023 0.2211 125	0.12617 0.1609 125	0.07417 0.4111 125	0.29763 0.0007 125	0.40071 <.0001 125	1.00000 125	0.22966 0.0100 125	-0.11056 0.2197 125	0.25481 0.0041 125	0.15815 0.0782 125	-0.13668 0.1285 125	0.32234 0.0002 125	0.18140 0.0429 125	0.10477 0.2449 125	0.28597 0.0012 125
Angry	0.19569 0.0322 120	0.15967 0.0815 120	0.26784 0.0031 120	-0.00284 0.9754 120	0.03461 0.7075 120	-0.44186 <.0001 125	0.03830 0.6716 125	0.46234 <.0001 125	0.57392 <.0001 125	0.46926 <.0001 125	0.22966 0.0100 125	1.00000 125	-0.17849 0.0464 125	0.44387 <.0001 125	0.55154 <.0001 125	-0.08275 0.3589 125	0.56752 <.0001 125	0.14410 0.1089 125	0.18654 0.0373 125	0.15295 0.0886 125
Meaning	-0.00718 0.9379 120	-0.09126 0.3215 120	-0.06016 0.5139 120	0.13460 0.1427 120	-0.03542 0.7009 120	0.36687 <.0001 125	0.10047 0.2649 125	-0.21419 0.0165 125	-0.38803 <.0001 125	-0.06520 0.4700 125	-0.11056 0.2197 125	-0.17849 0.0464 125	1.00000 125	-0.15704 0.0803 125	-0.29432 0.0009 125	0.49610 <.0001 125	-0.27592 0.0018 125	0.15758 0.0792 125	-0.06971 0.4398 125	-0.07107 0.4309 125
Ambig	0.12046 0.1900 120	0.11874 0.1965 120	0.20043 0.0282 120	-0.05575 0.5453 120	-0.06420 0.4860 120	-0.27209 0.0021 125	0.14390 0.1094 125	0.37343 <.0001 125	0.48346 <.0001 125	0.50485 <.0001 125	0.25481 0.0041 125	0.44387 <.0001 125	-0.15704 0.0803 125	1.00000 125	0.52218 <.0001 125	-0.04920 0.5859 125	0.44945 <.0001 125	0.21362 0.0168 125	0.18641 0.0374 125	0.08545 0.3434 125
Uncertain	0.10089 0.2729 120	0.14253 0.1204 120	0.16741 0.0676 120	-0.09057 0.3252 120	-0.10721 0.2438 120	-0.55881 <.0001 125	-0.04231 0.6394 125	0.54851 <.0001 125	0.64816 <.0001 125	0.50430 <.0001 125	0.15815 0.0782 125	0.55154 <.0001 125	-0.29432 0.0009 125	0.52218 <.0001 125	1.00000 125	-0.12463 0.1661 125	0.54738 <.0001 125	0.10235 0.2561 125	0.23830 0.0074 125	0.03703 0.6818 125
GoodHapp	-0.00702 0.9393 120	-0.07663 0.4055 120	-0.04685 0.6114 120	0.10756 0.2423 120	0.04965 0.5902 120	0.38271 <.0001 125	0.04620 0.6089 125	-0.21094 0.0182 125	-0.39124 <.0001 125	-0.11367 0.2069 125	-0.13668 0.1285 125	-0.08275 0.3589 125	0.49610 <.0001 125	-0.04920 0.5859 125	-0.12463 0.1661 125	1.00000 125	-0.25078 0.0048 125	-0.02649 0.7693 125	-0.17883 0.0460 125	-0.06111 0.4984 125
BadHapp	0.00144 0.9875 120	-0.00469 0.9595 120	0.08553 0.3530 120	-0.07145 0.4380 120	-0.00362 0.9687 120	-0.41579 <.0001 125	0.10764 0.2322 125	0.37861 <.0001 125	0.63709 <.0001 125	0.35457 <.0001 125	0.32234 0.0002 125	0.56752 <.0001 125	-0.27592 0.0018 125	0.44945 <.0001 125	0.54738 <.0001 125	-0.25078 0.0048 125	1.00000 125	0.08285 0.3583 125	0.22273 0.0125 125	0.03258 0.7183 125
Prep	0.37241 <.0001 120	0.31834 0.0004 120	0.19903 0.0293 120	0.26770 0.0031 120	0.28202 0.0018 120	-0.02804 0.7563 125	0.20638 0.0209 125	0.06997 0.4381 125	0.15848 0.0775 125	0.43000 <.0001 125	0.18140 0.0429 125	0.14410 0.1089 125	0.15758 0.0792 125	0.21362 0.0168 125	0.10235 0.2561 125	-0.02649 0.7693 125	0.08285 0.3583 125	1.00000 125	0.38398 <.0001 125	0.42018 <.0001 125
Death	0.27891 0.0020 120	0.24574 0.0068 120	0.16440 0.0728 120	0.17873 0.0508 120	0.03244 0.7251 120	-0.16018 0.0744 125	-0.01640 0.8559 125	0.08362 0.3539 125	0.23802 0.0075 125	0.26898 0.0024 125	0.10477 0.2449 125	0.18654 0.0373 125	-0.06971 0.4398 125	0.18641 0.0374 125	0.23830 0.0074 125	-0.17883 0.0460 125	0.22273 0.0125 125	0.38398 <.0001 125	1.00000 125	0.09897 0.2722 125
Weapon	0.13027 0.1561 120	0.21486 0.0184 120	0.08834 0.3373 120	-0.03017 0.7436 120	0.18039 0.0487 120	-0.02777 0.7585 125	0.01684 0.8521 125	-0.05956 0.5094 125	0.08611 0.3396 125	0.28290 0.0014 125	0.28597 0.0012 125	0.15295 0.0886 125	-0.07107 0.4309 125	0.08545 0.3434 125	0.03703 0.6818 125	-0.06111 0.4984 125	0.03258 0.7183 125	0.42018 <.0001 125	0.09897 0.2722 125	1.00000 125

## **Study 6a: Full Correlation Matrix**



	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PreppingBeliefs	PreppingBehavior	PBS	FISH	God	Conserv	Cynic	Conspiracy	SDO
PA_Pessim	1.00000 79	0.82848 <.0001 79	0.72941 <.0001 79	0.78387 <.0001 79	0.37301 0.0007 79	0.08918 0.4595 71	-0.16273 0.1720 72	0.03156 0.7838 78	0.17822 0.1210 77	0.62342 <.0001 78	0.40669 0.0002 78	0.28307 0.0120 78
HumNat_Res	0.82848 <.0001 79	1.00000 79	0.48827 <.0001 79	0.42070 0.0001 79	0.21948 0.0520 79	0.11027 0.3599 71	-0.08354 0.4854 72	-0.04368 0.7042 78	0.04393 0.7044 77	0.60817 <.0001 78	0.22133 0.0515 78	0.11182 0.3297 78
SocDar	0.72941 <.0001 79	0.48827 <.0001 79	1.00000 79	0.35201 0.0015 79	0.26902 0.0165 79	0.06275 0.6032 71	-0.12762 0.2854 72	0.00703 0.9513 78	0.14425 0.2107 77	0.48782 <.0001 78	0.32661 0.0035 78	0.34953 0.0017 78
PreppingBeliefs	0.78387 <.0001 79	0.42070 0.0001 79	0.35201 0.0015 79	1.00000 79	0.38538 0.0005 79	0.03557 0.7684 71	-0.16784 0.1588 72	0.11133 0.3318 78	0.23780 0.0373 77	0.37394 0.0007 78	0.41353 0.0002 78	0.24585 0.0300 78
PreppingBehavior	0.37301 0.0007 79	0.21948 0.0520 79	0.26902 0.0165 79	0.38538 0.0005 79	1.00000 79	0.14572 0.2253 71	-0.19582 0.0992 72	-0.04384 0.7031 78	0.00127 0.9913 77	0.33987 0.0023 78	0.35775 0.0013 78	-0.00672 0.9534 78
PBS	0.08918 0.4595 71	0.11027 0.3599 71	0.06275 0.6032 71	0.03557 0.7684 71	0.14572 0.2253 71	1.00000 71	0.07357 0.5450 70	0.17454 0.1484 70	0.11239 0.3579 69	-0.04627 0.7037 70	0.18287 0.1297 70	-0.07337 0.5461 70
FISH	-0.16273 0.1720 72	-0.08354 0.4854 72	-0.12762 0.2854 72	-0.16784 0.1588 72	-0.19582 0.0992 72	0.07357 0.5450 70	1.00000 72	0.18337 0.1258 71	0.20013 0.0967 70	-0.05614 0.6419 71	-0.05010 0.6782 71	0.06476 0.5916 71
God	0.03156 0.7838 78	-0.04368 0.7042 78	0.00703 0.9513 78	0.11133 0.3318 78	-0.04384 0.7031 78	0.17454 0.1484 70	0.18337 0.1258 71	1.00000 78	0.37215 0.0009 77	-0.08503 0.4592 78	0.05339 0.6425 78	0.04715 0.6819 78
Conserv	0.17822 0.1210 77	0.04393 0.7044 77	0.14425 0.2107 77	0.23780 0.0373 77	0.00127 0.9913 77	0.11239 0.3579 69	0.20013 0.0967 70	0.37215 0.0009 77	1.00000 77	0.02153 0.8526 77	0.10510 0.3630 77	0.42257 0.0001 77
Cynic	0.62342 <.0001 78	0.60817 <.0001 78	0.48782 <.0001 78	0.37394 0.0007 78	0.33987 0.0023 78	-0.04627 0.7037 70	-0.05614 0.6419 71	-0.08503 0.4592 78	0.02153 0.8526 77	1.00000 78	0.19845 0.0816 78	0.32647 0.0035 78
Conspiracy	0.40669 0.0002 78	0.22133 0.0515 78	0.32661 0.0035 78	0.41353 0.0002 78	0.35775 0.0013 78	0.18287 0.1297 70	-0.05010 0.6782 71	0.05339 0.6425 78	0.10510 0.3630 77	0.19845 0.0816 78	1.00000 78	0.28300 0.0121 78
SDO	0.28307 0.0120 78	0.11182 0.3297 78	0.34953 0.0017 78	0.24585 0.0300 78	-0.00672 0.9534 78	-0.07337 0.5461 70	0.06476 0.5916 71	0.04715 0.6819 78	0.42257 0.0001 77	0.32647 0.0035 78	0.28300 0.0121 78	1.00000 78

## Study 6b: Full Correlation Matrix

	PA_Pessim	HumNat_Res	SocDar	PreppingBeliefs	PreppingBehavior	PBS	FISH	God	Conserv	Cynic	Conspiracy	SDO
PA_Pessim	1.00000 <.0001 80	0.80332 <.0001 80	0.70841 <.0001 80	0.82859 <.0001 80	0.34998 0.0015 80	-0.39229 0.0003 80	-0.02349 0.8372 79	0.14096 0.2123 80	0.42264 <.0001 80	0.49668 <.0001 80	0.37722 0.0006 80	0.18713 0.0965 80
HumNat_Res	0.80332 <.0001 80	1.00000 80	0.39590 0.0003 80	0.46177 <.0001 80	0.25435 0.0228 80	-0.34708 0.0016 80	-0.07724 0.4987 79	-0.00398 0.9720 80	0.24465 0.0287 80	0.47953 <.0001 80	0.18204 0.1061 80	0.02141 0.8505 80
SocDar	0.70841 <.0001 80	0.39590 0.0003 80	1.00000 80	0.40160 0.0002 80	0.16517 0.1431 80	-0.29443 0.0080 80	0.22098 0.0503 79	0.09687 0.3927 80	0.41902 0.0001 80	0.51066 <.0001 80	0.16852 0.1351 80	0.44590 <.0001 80
PreppingBeliefs	0.82859 <.0001 80	0.46177 <.0001 80	0.40160 0.0002 80	1.00000 80	0.37142 0.0007 80	-0.28456 0.0105 80	-0.12392 0.2766 79	0.22566 0.0442 80	0.35422 0.0013 80	0.22876 0.0412 80	0.49079 <.0001 80	0.05666 0.6176 80
PreppingBehavior	0.34998 0.0015 80	0.25435 0.0228 80	0.16517 0.1431 80	0.37142 0.0007 80	1.00000 80	-0.00786 0.9449 80	-0.12892 0.2575 79	0.09337 0.4101 80	0.26778 0.0163 80	0.02975 0.7933 80	0.12114 0.2845 80	0.03179 0.7795 80
PBS	-0.39229 0.0003 80	-0.34708 0.0016 80	-0.29443 0.0080 80	-0.28456 0.0105 80	-0.00786 0.9449 80	1.00000 80	0.13343 0.2411 79	0.10294 0.3635 80	-0.11378 0.3149 80	-0.13187 0.2436 80	-0.04398 0.6985 80	-0.19892 0.0769 80
FISH	-0.02349 0.8372 79	-0.07724 0.4987 79	0.22098 0.0503 79	-0.12392 0.2766 79	-0.12892 0.2575 79	0.13343 0.2411 79	1.00000 80	-0.11369 0.3184 79	0.10354 0.3638 79	0.06197 0.5875 79	-0.03302 0.7727 79	0.29336 0.0087 79
God	0.14096 0.2123 80	-0.00398 0.9720 80	0.09687 0.3927 80	0.22566 0.0442 80	0.09337 0.4101 80	0.10294 0.3635 80	-0.11369 0.3184 79	1.00000 80	0.32665 0.0031 80	0.19535 0.0825 80	0.17303 0.1248 80	-0.12057 0.2867 80
Conserv	0.42264 <.0001 80	0.24465 0.0287 80	0.41902 0.0001 80	0.35422 0.0013 80	0.26778 0.0163 80	-0.11378 0.3149 80	0.10354 0.3638 79	0.32665 0.0031 80	1.00000 80	0.29643 0.0076 80	0.10395 0.3588 80	0.36211 0.0010 80
Cynic	0.49668 <.0001 80	0.47953 <.0001 80	0.51066 <.0001 80	0.22876 0.0412 80	0.02975 0.7933 80	-0.13187 0.2436 80	0.06197 0.5875 79	0.19535 0.0825 80	0.29643 0.0076 80	1.00000 80	0.27815 0.0125 80	0.11720 0.3005 80
Conspiracy	0.37722 0.0006 80	0.18204 0.1061 80	0.16852 0.1351 80	0.49079 <.0001 80	0.12114 0.2845 80	-0.04398 0.6985 80	-0.03302 0.7727 79	0.17303 0.1248 80	0.10395 0.3588 80	0.27815 0.0125 80	1.00000 80	-0.12983 0.2510 80
SDO	0.18713 0.0965 80	0.02141 0.8505 80	0.44590 <.0001 80	0.05666 0.6176 80	0.03179 0.7795 80	-0.19892 0.0769 80	0.29336 0.0087 79	-0.12057 0.2867 80	0.36211 0.0010 80	0.11720 0.3005 80	-0.12983 0.2510 80	1.00000 80